INDIANA vs. OHIO AND MISS. RAILROAD CO.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
THE STATE OF INDIANA vs. THE OHIO AND MISSISSIPPI RAILROAD
COMPANY. 1
The proper process in a criminal prosecution is a warrant for the body of the
defendant. No other process is authorized by law in this state.
A summons is not a proper process in a criminal prosecution. And the service of a summons, in a criminal prosecution against a body corporate, upon an
agent, attorney, or director of the corporation, is not sufficient to compel a corporation to plead.
Distringas,as a mode of compelling an appearance in a criminal case, is a writ
unknown to our law.
The common law of England, as to crimes and misdemeanors, is not in force
in this state.
A corporation cannot be prosecuted, by information or otherwise, for a misfeasance.
A corporation is created by law for certain .beneficial purpoies. They can
neither commit a crime or misdemeanor byany positive or affirmative act, or incite others to do so, as a corporation.
The case of The State vs. Great Works Milling and Manufacturing Company, 20
Maine R. 41, fully set out and approved.

Oscar B. Nord, Attorney-General, and John Schwartz, of
Lawrenceburgb, for the State.-A corporation is indictable for
a misfeasance or crime, citing State vs. Dover, 9 N. H. 468 ;
B. C.
hf.
X B?. R. Co. vs. The State, 32 N. H. (1 Fogg) ; State
. o., 3 Zabriskie (N. Jersey R.) 360 ; Angell
vs. .3.
E B.R.
& Ames on Corporations, 5th Ed., p. 395.
A summons is the proper process against a corporation in a
criminal case; and if the corporation does not appear and plead,
then to compel an appearance by -writ of distringas.
The word "person," in the criminal code, includes a corporation : 2 Gavin & Hord, Revised Statutes, p. 335, § 797.
Theodore Gazlay and Carter Gaziay, of Cincinnati, for the
Railroad Company.-A corporation cannot be indicted or otherwise criminally prosecuted for a misfeasance. A corporation, in
its corporate capacity, cannot commit a crime. Angell & Ames
on Corporations, 3d Ed., p. 292, § 9 ; 20 Maine Reports 41 ; Kyd
on Corporations 225 and 226; Orrvs. the Bank of U.S., 1 Ohio R.
36. They also contended, that, by the laws of Indiana, there was
no provision of law to bring a corporation into court to answer a
1 We are indebted for this case to C. GAMLY, Esq.
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criminal prosecution ; that the only writ authorized was one requiring the officer to take into custody the body of the defendant; that the writ of distringas was not a writ used in criminal
proceedings, but was in the nature of an attachment, and only
used in civil actions. That the common law of England did not
authorize the prosecution of a corporation. for a misfeasance ; and
that the common law of England, as to criminal proceedings, is not, and never was in force in Indiana; and cited numerous authorities to sustain their positions. They also contended
that the decisions in England, in New Hampshire, and New Jersey were upon statutes of those states, and cited clauses in the
opinions, showing such to be the case ; and that Angell & Ames,
in the 5th edition of their work, had departed from the correct
doctrine laid down in their 3d edition, by a careless reading of
the cases.
PER CURiAm.-Solon Russell, District Attorney, filed an affidavit and information in the Court of Common Pleas of Dearborn county against the appellee, for obstructing a public highway. A summons was issued, and served by delivering a certified
copy thereof to Lewis W. Drake, station agent at Lawrenceburgh, and by leaving a certified copy thereof at the residence
of Theodore Gazlay, in Dearborn county, attorney and director of said railroad company.
The Railroad Company, at the February term, 1863, of said
Court of Common Pleas, entered a special appearance, by her
attorney for that purpose, and moved the court to quash the writ
issued in the cause, and set aside the service thereof.
The court sustained the motion, and the appellant excepted.
The appellee then, by her attorney, moved the court that the
prosecution be dismissed, for the following reasons: 1st. There
is no law in force in Indiana authorizing a corporation to be prosecuted criminally for a misfeasance. 2d. The corporation, in its
corporate capacity, cannot violate the penal statutes of the state.
Which motion the court sustained, and the state excepted.
The action of the court below in sustaining these motions,
presents questions for the consideration of this court.
Our criminal law is entirely of statutory origin. We have not
adopted the common law of England as to crimes. See Beal vs.
The State, 15 Indiana R. 378.
A warrant, and not a summons, is the process in criminal
cases in this state. 2 Gavin & Hord, 396, 397.
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The act establishing the Court of Common Pleas provides
that ",all crimilial proceedings may be commenced in said court,
by filing with the clerk a written charge, verified by affidavit, on
which, process shall issue for the body of the defendant." 2 Gavin & Hord, 24 § 15.
-istringas, as a means of compelling an appearance in a criminal case, is a writ unknown to our law.
The court below committed no error in setting aside the process and the service thereof.
The only remaining question is, Can a railroad corporation be
guilty of a misdemeanor in obstructing a lhighway in this state ?
The Misdemeanor Act provides that " any person, who shall,
in any manner, obstruct any public highway, &c., such person,
and all other persons aiding or abetting therein, shall be fined
not exceeding five hundred dollars, or imprisoned not exceeding
three months." 2 Gavin & Hord 475, § 66.
It is contended by counsel for the state, that the word person
extends to corporations, and a provision of the civil code is cited
in support of such construction. 2 Gavin & Hord 335, § 797.
The language is, "the word person extends to bodies politic
and corporate." Under this clause, the word "person," when
used in the statutes embraced by it, includes the United States,
as well as this state. But this rule of construction does not apply to the criminal code. That code provides that "when the
term person or other word is used to designate the party whose
property is the subject of an offence, or against whom any act is
done with intent to defraud or injure, the term may be construed
to include the United States, this state, or any other state or
territory, or any public or private corporation, as well as an individual." 2 Gavin & Hord 428, § 170.
The construction claimed by counsel for the state would lead
to absurdities.
But, independent of this, there can be no agency in the commission of misdemeanors. A corporation can only act by agents.
The agent, and not the principal, is the guilty party.
The rule is well considered in the case of The State vs. Great.
Works Milling and 1_Manufacturing Company, 20 Maine R. 41.
In that case the corporation was indicted for a nuisance in the
erection of a dam across the Penobscot River, thereby 6bstructing the use of the river (as a public highway) for the purposes
of navigation. The jury at nisipriusfound a verdict of guilty,
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and the corporation appealed to the Supreme Court. The opinion
of the Supreme Court, delivered by C. J. WESTON, is as follows:
" A corporation is created by law for certain beneficial purposes.
They can neither commit a crime or misdemeanor by any positive
or affirmative act, or incite others to do so as a corporation.
While assembled at a corporate meeting a majority may, by a
vote entered upon their records, require an agent to commit a
battery, but if he does so, it cannot be regarded as a corporate
act for which the corporation can be indicted.
"cIt would be stepping aside altogether from their corporate
powers. If indictable as a corporation for an offence thus incited by them, the innocent dissenting minority become equally
amenable to punishment with the guilty majority. Such only as
take part in the measure should be prosecuted as individuals,
either as principals, or aiding and abetting or procuring an offence to be committed, according to its character or magnitude.
"cIt is a doctrine then, in conformity with the demands of justice; and a proper distinction between the innocent and the guilty,
that when a crime or misdemeanor is committed under color of
corporate authority, the individuals acting in the business, and
not the corporation, should be indicted. Angell &Ames on Corporations 396, § 9.
"cWe think it cannot be doubted that the erection of a public
nuisance is a misdemeanor. There are cases where quasi corporations are indictable for neglect of duties imposed by law.
Towns, for instance, charged with maintenance of the public
highways, are by statute indictable for any failure of duty in this
respect.
"cThe corporation here attempted to be charged have violated
no duty imposed upon them by statute.. 'Whatever has been
done, was by the hand or procurement of individuals. They
may be indicted and punished, and the nuisance abated. We
have been referred to no precedent where an indictment has been
sustained against a corporation upon such a charge; and, in our
opinion, the individuals concerned, and not the corporation, must
be held criminally answerable for what was done."
Whatever may be the rule in England and in those states in
which the common law as to crimes is -recognised, in this state,
under the criminal law, a corporation cannot be prosecuted, by information or otherwise, for a misfeasance. All of the judges concurring, the judgment of the court below is in all things affirmed.

BRAUNBERGER vs. CLEIS.

.District Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
BRAUNBERGER V8. CLEIS.
The law does not imply, on the part of a physician, an uwdertaking to use the
highest professional skill; but it does require the use of a reasonable degree of
care and professional skill.

What is reasonable care and skill must be determined in each case from the
circumstances.
The words "unlawful violence or negligence," in the statute giving an action
to surviving relatives for an injury causing death, include malpractice as a physician.
But the malpractice must be such as caused the death. 'Mere malpractice,
however gross, if not the proximate cause of the death, will not support this
action.
The measure of damages is the pecuniary loss of the plaintiff.

This was an action by Catherine Braunberger against Dr.
George Oleis, to recover, in her own right and in right of her
three minor children, damages for the death of her husband,
Albert F. Braunberger, occasioned, as she alleges, by the negligence and unskilfulness of the defendant, who was employed as
physician and surgeon to treat him for an injury which he had received in his leg.
A. 11. Brown and J. J. Siebeneck, for plaintiff.
C. B. H. Smith, . H. Hampton, and J.
defendant.

.Kwthen, for the

WILLIAMS, J., after reviewing the evidence, charged the jury
as follows:The plaintift alleges that her husband's death was occasioned
by the negligence and nnskilfulness of the defendant, and that
he is responsible for the damages which she and her children
have sustained in consequence of his death.
The principles of law applicable to this case are simple and
easily understood. When one is employed as a physician or surgaon, the law implies an undertaking on his part that he will use
a reasonable degree of cae and skill in the treatment of his
patient, or in the performance of the professional duty which he
undertakes ; and in judging of this degree of skill, regard is to
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be had to the advanced state of the profession at the time. This
is the implied duty of the medical or surgical practitioner, and
he is responsible for any injury which may be occasioned by his
want of reasonable care and skill in the discharge of the particular duty which he undertakes, and for which he may have
'been retained. In this respect the law exacts no more of medical practitioners or'surgeons, than it does of those engaged in
any other profession or calling where care and skill are requisite
for the successful accomplishment of the duties incident and appropriate to such profession or calling, whatever it may be.
The law does not imply an undertaking on the part of medical
and surgical practitioners, any more than it does on the part of
those engaged in other professions or callings, that they will use
the highest degree of care and skill attainable or known in the
profession. If it did, but few would be competent to practise
the medical, surgical, or any other profession. For but few comparatively possess the requisite natural endowments, the industry,
energy, and perseverance, the opportunities for study and improvement, and the experience necessary and indispensable for
the attainment of the highest degree of professional skill. The
law, therefore, very properly requires no more of the medical
and surgical practitioner than the use of a reasonable degree of
care and skill in the discharge of the duty or office he may be
called upon to perform; but it rigorously exacts this degree of
care and skill, and it implies an undertaking on his part to use
such reasonable care and skill in the discharge of his professional
duty, and it renders him responsible for any injury which may
result from the want thereof. Reasonable care and skill is a
phrase not of absolute, but of relative import' or signification.
What may, or may not be, reasonable care and skill depends
very much upofi the nature of the duty to be performed, or the
thing to be done and the attendant circumstances. The more
difficult the duty or operation, the greater is the degree of care
and skill requisite for its successful accomplishment. And in the
q performance of very difficult and dangerous operations in surgery,
the surgical practitioner is required to possess and employ a higher
degree of care and skill than would be necessary for the performance of operations less difficult or dangerous. But he is
only required to employ a reasonable degree of care and skill in
these operations, and in the previous and subsequent treatment
of the case-that is to say, such a de ree of care and skill as
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men of ordinary prudence, learning, and skill in this department
or profession usually possess and employ; and if he does not, he
is responsible for the injury occasioned by his negligence or unskilfulness in this respect.
By the common law, no action could be maintained by the
widow or other relatives of a deceased person to recover damages
for an injury, resulting in death, when occasioned by unlawful
violence or negligence. If the injury thus occasioned did not
result in death, the sufferer might recover damages therefor; but
if death was the result the common law gave no action, for the
recovery of damages, to the relatives or personal representatives
of the deceased. This defect in the law was remedied by the
legislature of this state by an act passed the 15th of April, 1851;
the 19th section of which is in these words :"Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or
negligence, and no suit for damages be brought by the party
injured during his or her life, the widow of any such deceased,
or, if there be no widow, the personal representatives, may maintain an action for and recover for the death thus occasioned."
By a supplement to, this act, approved the 26th of April, 1855,
it is declared that " the persons entitled to recover damages for
any injury causing death, shall be the husband, widow, children,
or parents of the deceased, and no other relative; and the sum
recovered shall go to them in the proportion they would take his
or her personal estate in case of intestacy, and that without liability to creditors."
By "unlawful violence," as used in the Act of 1851, is meant
the improper, and, therefore, unlawful use or employment of
physical force, however applied. It is the abuse of force, and
implies a positive act. "Negligence" is the omission of something that ought to be done. It is negative in its character. It
is the not doing what ought to be done. It is omitting to do
something which reason, prudence, and skill would suggest as
proper and necessary to be done under the circumstances of the
case. And whenever death happens from either of these causes,
viz., " unlawful violence or negligence," an action may be maintained under the statute, and damages recovered therefor.
It is contended by defendant's counsel that mere malpractice
by a physician or surgeon id not such " unlawful violence or negligence" as is contemplated by the act, and that for this reason
there can be no recovery in this action. But the act, both in its
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letter and spirit, is, in my opinion, suffciently comprehensive to
embrace the case of death resulting from malpractice, whenever
occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence. In all cases in
which by the common law an action could be maintained and
damages recovered for an injury, not resulting in death, occasioned by malpractice, an action on the statute may now be
maintained if death result therefrom, when such malpractice
consists in "unlawful violence or negligence." It cannot be
doubted that malpractice on the part of a physician or surgeon
may consist in unlawful violence, that is to say, the improper and
unlawful use of physical force, as well as in negligence, or the
omission to use the appropriate and indispensable means for the
recovery of the patient, or the preservation of his life. And, in
either case, whether by unlawful violence or negligence, if death
be the result, he is responsible therefor. But the fact that the
physician or surgeon may have been guilty of malpractice, however gross in its character, will not render him respongible in an
action on the statute at the suit of the widow or other relatives,
unless the death of the deceased was occasioned by such malpractice. If the deceased might have survived and recovered from
the injury occasioned by the unskilfulness or negligence of the
physician or surgeon, under proper treatment and by the use of
the appropriate and necessary means, after the discharge of such
physician or surgeon for incompetency or unskilfulness; or if the
death is fairly attributable to, or actually resulted from some
other cause, there can be no recovery in an action on this statute.
There may be no doubt or question as to the malpractice of the
physician or surgeon, but unless the death of the deceased was
the result thereof, his widow and children are not entitled to
maintain an action and recover damages therefor. But if the
death was occasioned by malpractice in either of the modes suggested, viz. by the improper application of physical force, or, in
the language of the statute, by "unlawful violence," or by the
omission of the appropriate means, that is, by "negligence," the
,statute gives a remedy, and damages may be recovered therefor
by the widow and children.
It will be the duty of the jury to apply these principles to the
evidence in the case. There is no evidence that the defendant
was guilty of any "unlawful violence" in the treatment of the
deceased, which caused his death. Whether his death was occasioned by the negligence and unskilfulness of the defendant, is a
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question of fact for the determination of the jury. The responsibility of determining this question is upon them, and not upon
the court.
The plaintiff's counsel contend that the death of plaintiff's
husband was caused by the negligence and unskilfulness of the
defendant in not ascertaining the nature and extent of the injury,
and making use of the appropriate means for the treatment of
the same, and for the preservation of his life.
They allege that the defendant's negligence and unskilfulness
are shown by the fact, that he mistook the injured condition of
the leg-crushed, fractured, and broken tb pieces as it was-Lfor
a mere flesh-wound ; and that this radical error in regard to the.
nature of the wound, and its consequent treatment as a mere
flesh-wound, was the grossest malpractice on the part of the
defendant, and the cause of the death of plaintiff's husband.
The defendant's counsel do not deny that their client was mistaken in regard to the nature and extent of the injury, and in
the treatment appropriate thereto ; but they contend that this
mistake as to the nature of the injury and its appropriate treatment was not the cause of his death. If the jury believe the.
evidence, there can be no doubt that the defendant failed to discover the nature and extent'of the injury, and that he might and
ought to have ascertained this if he had employed ordinary and
reasonable care and skill in the examination of the wound, and
that his treatment of the injury as a mere flesh-wound was notthe proper and appropriate treatment of a leg broken and ground to pieces as this leg was, with the fractures extending into the
knee-joint. While quackery and empiricism ought not to receive
any countenance from the court and jury, in any profession, andleast of all in the medical and surgical, where the consequences
are so serious and often fatal, yet the court and jury, in dealing
with cases of manifest malpractice, ought to be careful not to
impute or attribute to such malpractice consequences which do
not legitimately and properly result from it. Did, then, the
mistake which the defendant made in regard to the nature and
extent of the injury, and-his consequent mistreatment of the
case, cause the death of the plaintiff's husband? This is a question of fact for the determination of the jury under all the evidence in the cause. It is often, perhaps always, a difficult thing
to ascertain and determine the consequences necessarily and
actually resulting from malpractice. It is an inquiry requiring
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more knowledge, scientific skill, and experience in such matters,
than men ordinarily possess; and therefore the law allows experts, that is, persons learned and skilled in such matters and
pursuits, to be called in to aid the court and jury in the investi
gation; and great weight is to be attached to their opinions.
Where they agree in opinion upon a given hypothesis or state
of facts, their opinion should be regarded as conclusive thereon ;
but it is always the duty of the jury to determine whether the
given state of facts, or the supposed hypothesis, exists, or is
established by the evidence. While the physicians and surgeons
who have been examined in this cause differ in some respects,
they all agree in the following particulars:1. That there was no possible chance of saving the life of the
plaintiff's husband, except in amputating the broken leg, because
the fractures extended into the knee joint. They all agree that
there was no other possible way of saving his life.
2. They all agree that amputation is not to be performed unless
the system of the patient is in a fit condition; that it would be
unpardonable to amputate when the system is in a state of shock;
that where the result of an injury is a shock of the whole nervous
and vital system, it would be death to amputate in such a condition.
3. That in case of shock amputation should be performed as
soon as the system has recovered from the shock-in other words
as soon as the system has rallied and reaction has taken place.
4. That in case of shock, if the system does not rally, or if reaction does not begin to take place, it is the duty of the surgeon
to make use of the proper means to bring on reaction by giving
stimulating remedies, and endeavoring to produce heat in the
system by artificial means.
These are well-established principles of surgery, in regard to
which there is no dispute. The intelligent and skilful surgeon
should always act in conformity with these principles in determining whether amputation should or should not be performed; and
in determining the probable results or consequences to the patient,
if the operation is or is not performed. Bearing in mind these
cardinal principles of the science, the jury will determine :1. Whether the injury to the plaintiff's husband resulted in
that condition or state of the system called shock, and whether
the nervous and vital system was so shocked as to render amputation of his leg not only dangerous but probably fatal ? Or,
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whether the shock of the system was so slight that the operation
might have been performed with a reasonable prospect of saving
his life ?
2. If the shock was so great that death would have been the
result of amputation, while the system was in that condition, was
there such a rallying or reaction of the system that amputation
might have been safely performed with a reasonable prospect of
saving the patient's life?
3. If reaction did not take place, might it in all human probability have been produced by the use of the appropriate means
or remedies Z
4. Was the plaintiff's husband in a fit condition for the amputation of his leg at the time of the consultation between the
defendant and Drs. Kern and Brooks, and if they had then been
permitted to perform the operation, is it probable that the life of
the plaintiff's husband would have been saved?
If the jury find that the, deceased was in a fit condition to have
his leg amputated with safety to his life soon after the injury ;
that his system was not in a state of shock, or, if it was, that it
rallied and recovered therefrom, so that amputation might have
been safely performed while the defendant had charge of the case,
then it was his duty to amputate; and if amputation could not
have been safely performed at any time after he ceased to have
charge of the case, and if the death of the deceased was occasioned by the neglect of the defendant t1' perform the operation
at the proper time, he is responsible for the consequences of his
negligence and unskilfulness, and this action may be maintained
for the recovery of such damages as the widow and children have
sustained thereby.
But if the deceased was so prostrated by the injury he received-if he was in such a state of shock-that amputation could
not safely be performed; if his system did not rally, or might
not have rallied by the use of appropriate means, so that his leg
could be amputated with safety to his life; if he would. probably
have died whether his leg was amputated or not, then* there can
be no recovery against the defendant in this action, although he
may have grossly mistaken the nature and extent of the injury,
and the treatment appropriate thereto. Nor can there be any
recovery against the defenaant if amputation might have been
safely performed at any time after the defendant ceased to attend
the deceased, and another surgeon had been called to take charge
VOL. XII.-38
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of the case. The defendant is not responsible for any neglect or
omission of duty after his connection with the case had ceased.
If the life of the deceased might have been saved if his leg had
been amputated on the day that Dr. Walter was called to attend
him, the defendant is not responsible in damages for his death.
The jury will determine what are the facts from all the evidence
in the case.
If the jury find for the plaintiff, they will assess such damages
as will compensate the widow and children for the pecuniary loss
they have sustained by the death of the deceased. The jury are
not required to estimate the value of his life. If they were,
dollars and cents would be a poor standard with which to measure
the value of the life of a human being. They are only required
to give damages for his death. The widow and children of the
deceased are not entitled to recover anything by way of solace
for their wounded feelings ; they are only entitled to recover
damages for the pecuniary loss they have sustained in cofisequence
of his death. The damages ought not to be extravagant or unreasonable. If the defendant had been actuated by malice, the
jury might give vindictive damages. But the defendant was not
actuated by malice. If he caused the death of the deceased it
was not intentional, but the result of ignorance and unskilfulness,
and therefore the jury should be merciful while they do justice.
The points submitted by defendant's counsel are affirmed.
The jury found a verdict for plaintiff for $3250.

preme Court of Maine.
WOODBRIDGE CLIFFORD ET AL. VS. THOMASTON MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY.
If a policy of insurance on a vessel expires while she is supposed to be on a
voyage, and a second policy for a different sum is taken, after the expiration of
the first, there is, in this country, no rule of law which requires payment of that
policy under which the vessel sailed, or was last heard from, in the absence of
proof of the time of loss.
It is a question of fact for the jury to determine when a presumption of loss
arises. So, also, in case of loss, the time it occurred.

On report from Nisi Prius, DAVIS, J., presiding.
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This was an action of assumpsit upon a policy of insurance in
the sum of $2000, on one-fourth of the brig Hesperus, fer one
The plainyear from the 13th day of January 1855, at noon.
tiffs are said Clifford, Elbridge Huff, and James Chase; the policy
was to ,, W. Clifford and whom it concerns."
The brig sailed from Boston for the Lobos Islands-a voyage
of thirty or forty days-on the 4th day of January 1856, as the
plaintiffs contend, or on the 9th day of the same month, as iscontended by the defendants, and wag never beard of afterwards.
On the 26th day of January 1856, said Clifford obtained from
the defendants another policy upon his interest in the brig, for
$1000 for one year from the 13th day of January 1856, at noon;
on which policy an action is pending, a suit having been instituted
to save the limitation of the statute accepting the surrender of
the defendant company.
Abandonment was duly made.
The question to be determined, is, under which policy the loss
occurred. It was contended by the plaintiffs that there is a rule
of law, which requires that policy to be paid under which the
vessel sailed, or was last heard of, in the absence of proof of the
time of loss. The defendants contended the turden was upon
the plaintiffs to show that the vessel was lost before noon of the
18th of January.*
If the court should be of the opinion, that, upon the facts
reported, the defendants are liable in this action, they are to be
defaulted; but if there is no such rule of law, as plaintiffs claim,
and the defendant's liability is a question of fact for the jury,
the action is to stand for trial.
M. H. Smith, for the plaintiffs.-" In the case of missing vessels the loss is presumed to have happened immediately after the
date of the last news, so that if an insurance be for three months,
and the vessel not being heard from, a further insurance is made
for a year, and the vessel is never heard from, in that case the
first insurer pays the loss :" 3 Kent's Com. 301.
The law in France is the same: Boulay Paty, Droit Com.,
tom. 4, p. 248, ed. 1823.
The Guidon de la Mer states that the assured , is to furnish
valid attestation of the loss or capture, containing the hour and
place where it happened, if it may be. This expression; 2if it may
be, decides the question against the insurer, so that if the assured
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cannot prove at what time the vessel has perished, it is to be
presumed that the loss happened before the final term of the
insurance."
Another question, stated by Emerigon :-, I have caused my
vessel to be insured for three months, reckoning from the day of
departure. Not having any news of her after this term, I effect
second insurances. One year or two years pass away without its
being known what has become of her. Shall the loss fall on the
first insurers or on the second? I think that it should fall on
the first, and that the second insurers are in the case of return
of premiums. I rest on the example of the absent, and I add
that the second insurances do not cover the preceding ones, which
consequently remain in all their force, until the first insurers
have shown that the disaster has happened after the time fixed
by their policy.
-The question is then the same, whether the insurances on
time have been repeated or have not been so, provided the epoch
of the loss be absolutely unknown. This repetition of insurance
is a fact foreign to the first insurance :" Emerigon, translated by
Meridith, p. 617, ed. of 1850.
Emerigon also states, pages 613, 614:- The vessel of which no news is heard during a certain time
is presumed to be lost; it is a legal presumption that the vessel
is lost, because default of news is viewed as a legitimate attestation of loss."
The question presented has never been decided in this state.
When a principle of commercial law is unsettled, the rule adopted
by other commercial nations, and especially by so old a nation as
France, approved as it is in the United States by authority so
high as that of Mr. Chancellor KENT, is worthy of respectful
consideration, if indeed it should not be implicitly followed.
The rule as laid down by KENT, and as established in France,
is one demanded by public policy, for reasons similar to those
that caused the adoption of the rule deducting one-third new for
old in the case of repairs. This is a positive rule, originating in
the convenience of having a determinate and precise test in all
cases, which, by its universality and uniformity, may render unnecessary inquiries into matters and circumstances necessarily
uncertain, and which circumstances are rather calculated to perplex than' elucidate.. See Smith vs. Bell, 2 Caines Cases in
Error 157.
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The rule of deducting one-third new for old has been adopted
on the ground of public policy, and to prevent a multiplicity of
suits, although by its application an exactly correct result can
never be arrived at, and in many cases the result may be very
far from correct; and although the value of the old and of the
new is capable, of being proved, while in the case at bar the time
of the loss is not capable of being proved, nor is the loss itself
capable of proof except as a legal presumption arising solely from
lapse of time, and not from weather, storms, &c.
If the ruling contended for by defendants is adopted, in every
instance of a missing vessel insured when last heard of, a trial
must be had to establish the fact of the time of loss, and the fact
that there are two policies does not alter it. If this rule be
adopted, if there had been no second policy, the plaintiffs in the
case at bar must prove the vessel lost before 'the expiration of
the first policy, or he could not recover, although the vessel had
not been heard from for any number of years.
To use the form of expression before quoted from the Guidon
de la Mer, the time of loso is to be proved, " if it may be," and
as is there stated, this cif it may be decides the question against
the insurer."
If it were possible for the insured to prove the exact time of
loss, he would be obliged so to do, he taking the onus probandi.
If it were possible for the insurers to prove, or even to produce
testimony tending to prove that the vessel was not lost within the
time covered by the policy, by any peril for which insurers would
be liable, they would be allowed to prove it.
As both these propositions involve an impossibility, it may not
be, and the proposed testimony as to time of loss is neither demanded nor to be allowed.
In England and the United States, no certain time is fixed
when a missing vessel shall be presumed to be lost. Phillips on
Insurance, vol. 2, p. 661, states the rule to be, "cA vessel z't
heard from for some while after reasonabletime for intelligence,
is presumed to have been lost by perils of the sea."
It will be perceived that the presumption of loss depends upon
time alone since heard from-either one and a half years, as in
Spain, one or two years, as in France, or a reasonable time as in
England and the United States. How long a time would be a
reasonable time, within which a vessel must be heard from, would
of course depend much upon the length of her intended 'voyage.
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In the case at bar, defendants do not contend but that sufficient
time had elapsed before the commencement of this suit, to raise
the legal presumption of a loss of the brig. Nor can they contend that the law requires any further or other proof than of the
lapse of time since heard from, to establish the loss, and it would
seem that the loss being admitted, they should not be allowed to
say to plaintiffs in this suit, in addition to proof of loss by the
legal presumption-you must also prove that the loss took place
before January 13th 1856, to entitle you to recover. If defendants can take this position, what is the propriety, or what the use
of proving the lapse of time since the vessel was heard from?
Gould, for the defendants.-This case is now presented to
ascertain upon what principles the trial of it should proceed. Is
there any rule of-law which will determine it? Is proof of usage
admissible to control it? Is there any presumption of loss in the
case of missing vessels, and, if so, when will it arise ? Is there
anything which takes the case out of the general rule, that the
burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that the loss took place
within the life of the policy ? If not, what proof may be regarded
as sufficient to authorize a jury to find a loss?
When a missing vessel shall be presumed to have perished by
perils of the sea depends upon circumstances, and there is no
precise time fixed by the English law: 3 Kent's Com. 301. See,
also, 2 Arnould's Ins. 793-4; Greene vs. Brown, 2 Strange
1199; loustman vs. Thornton, Holt's N. P. 242; Newley vs.
Reed, cited in Marshall's Ins. 490 ; Koster vs. Reed, 6 B. & C.
19; Brown et al. vs. Neilson et al., 1 Caines 525; Gordon vs.
Brown, 2 Johns. 150; Paddock vs. Franklin Insurance Co., 11
Pick. 237; Cohen vs. Hfinkley, 2 Camp. 51; 2 Greenl. Ev.,
§ 386; 3 Starkie's Ev. 1165-6; Park's Ins. (7th Ed.) 106;
2 Phillips's Ins. 465 (Ed. of 1834).
But all the cases furnish no definite aid in this case.- No presumption of loss could arise from lapse of time, the policy having
but four days to run, when the vessel sailed on a voyage of thiriy
or forty days, and, so far as is known, no such storm occurred
during the first of the voyage, as to render it reasonably certain
that the vessel was lost during the life of the policy.
What will the jury be authorized to do? In Cbles vs. Marine
Insurance Co., 3 Wash. C. C. R. 161, it is said, that "it is not
enough for the assured to prove that there was a storm, or any
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other peril encountered by the ship during the voyage, but he
must also show that the loss was caused thereby." See, also,
Coffin vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 15 Pick. 291.
KENT, as cited by plaintiffs, is simply stating a rule of foreign
law (French), while he expressly states that no such rule obtains
in England or in this country.
The question is not, whether the vessel is lost, but was she lost
within the life of the policy ?
The present lapse of time is, undoubtedly, sufficient to raise
the presumption of loss; but did the lapse of four days after the
vessel sailed, raise the presumption that she was lost within the
life of the policy?
The opinion of the court was .delivered by
MAY, J.-Insurance, for $2000, was effected by the plaintiffs,
in the defendant company, by a policy upon one-fourth of the
brig Hesperus, for one year from the 13th day of January 1855,
at noon, upon which policy this action is brought. The brig
sailed from Boston for the Lobos Islands not more than nine days
before the expiration of said policy, the voyage, ordinarily, requiring from thirty to forty days, and has not been heard from
since her departure. Subsequently, Woodbridge Clifford, one of
the plaintiffs, effected another insurance in the same company,
upon one-eighth of said brig, the risk commencing at the termination of the first policy.
It is conceded by the defendants that the brig had been missing for a period of time sufficiently long to raise the presumption of her loss prior to the commencement of this suit; and the
only question now raised, is, whether the common law, which
prevails in this state, hfis any fixed rule by which the loss, in case
of missing vessels, is to be presumed as having occurred immediately after the date of the last news, so that the loss must fall
under the policy then in force, without regard to any evidence
offered touching the state of the weather after sailing, the dangers of the voyage in its various parts, the season of the year,
and other circumstances" tending to show when the loss probably
occurred. It is contended for the plaintiff that such is the law.
The authorities cited by the counsel for the plaintiffs, in his
very able argument upon the question presented, clearly show
that the rule he contends for is the law of France; and the reasons which he presents, as tending to show the propriety and

-
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-necessity of the rule, are not without great force. It appears,
however, that this rule'as stated by Emerigon, and other distinguished foreign writers, had its origin, not in the common law,
but in an ancient ordinance of the French government. So, too,
the same government, as well as Spain, and perhaps some other
European states, has its fixed rule as to what length of time a
vessel must be at sea, without being heard from, in order to raise
a presumption of loss. The time, however, differs in different
eountries and in different voyages. The commercial policy of
each of the governments referred to, has, however, made the rule
as to time, when a presumption of loss shall arise, absolute in
I
each particular case.
No case has been cited, in this country or from England, in
which it has been held that the.common law has anyfixed time
within which the loss of a missing vessel, unheard from, is to be
presumed, and, when presumed from the facts and circumstances
of the case, no case is found fixing the precise time .of the loss or
that it occurred immediately after the latest news. On the contrary, all the cases, so far as any have been cited or examined,
show that the question when a presumption of loss arises, is a
question of fact for the jury, to be determined in view of all the
facts and circumstances in the case; and, when a presumption of
loss has arisen, the question as to the precise time when it occurred, is to be determined in the same way.
In the case of Brown et al. vs. Nielson et al., 1 Caines 525,
cited in defence, it appears that the missing-vessel sailed from
Norfolk, Ya., for New York, March 4th 1801, the policy expiring
the 28th of the same month; and the question, whether the loss
happened within the life of the policy, was submitted to the jury
under instructions from the presiding judge, that they must determine the time of the loss from the evidence in the case, and
this instruction was held to be correct.
In Arnould on Insurance, vol. 2 (Perkins's 2d ed.), p. 79T, the
author, after stating the rule in France to be that, in the case of
a missing ship, the loss will be presumed to have happened immediately after the last news, says that, " in our law wo fixed period8
are established after which a ship not heard of shall be deemed
to have perished at sea, but each case is left to depend on its own
circumstances and the judgment of practical men." As no
authority is cited to the contrary from any court of common law,
it may well be presumed that Chancellor KENT, in the extract

CLIFFORD vs. INSURANCE CO.

cited from his Commentaries, vol. 3, p. 801, had reference to the
French rule before referred to ; but, if it is not so, he is unsustained by any respectable authority. From the authorities which
have been cited, and many others that might be, we have no hesitancy in coming to the conclusion, that no such rule exists at
common law as that for which the counsel for the plaintiffs contends.
It may not, however, be needless to remark, that the conclusion
to which we have arrived, is greatly strengthened by the decided
cases, in regard to the precise time of the death of a person, who
has been absent from the place of his residence for seven years
or more, without being heard from. The cases are uniform that,
although the presumption of his death arises at the end of seven
years, yet there is no presumption of law as to what precise time
it occurred, and the time of his death is to be determined by a
jury, upon the circumstances of the case. See 1 Greenl. Ev.
§ 41, note 3, and cases there cited. In one of which, tlat of Doe
vs. Nepean, 5 B. & Ad. 86, it appears that the person, the time
of whose death came in question, was last known to have sailed
in a vessel which was never heard from, and yet the court held
that the precise time of his death was for the jury, upon the facts
in the case. In this case, in the absence of all other facts, there
could have been no reasonable doubt that the death of the person
in question, and the loss of the vessel in which he sailed, were
simultaneous, and yet no such rule as is now urged was contended
for. See, also, -Eagle vs. Emmett, 4 Brad. 117; Spencer vs.
Roper, 13' Iredell 333. This class of cases is so analogous' to
those involvixg the question before us, that no reason is perceived
why the same rule should not apply to both.
The question as to the admissibility of proof to show an existing usage among insurance offices, in the case of missing vessels,
to presume that the loss took place immediately after the last
news, though somewhat discussed by the counsel for the plaintiffs,
is not before us, and therefore is not considered. The result is,
that, according to thd agreement of the parties, the case is to
stand for trial.
Action to stand for trial.
TENNEY,

concurred.

C. J., Ricu, CUTTING, GOODENOW,

and

DAvis, JJ.,

HOLBROOK vs. VOSE.
The foregoing case seems to involve
a question of such unusual interest,
that we have regarded it worthy of preservation, in a form generally accessible to the profession, throughout the
country. We do not see how the courts
can adopt any general rule of presumption upon the question of the time of
loss in such cases, until the necessities

or convenience of business shall have
established one. Questions of reasonable time, in all cases of demand and
notice, were originally determined by
the jury. It is now settled by custom
and usage, and has become a full rule
of law. The same may sometimes be
true in the question before us.
I.F. R.

Court of Appeals of New York.
LOWELL HOLBROOK AND OTHERS VS. FRANCIS VOSE AND OTHERS.
Where goods are sold by a vendor to a vendee transacting business at the same
plac3 with himself, and no transit of the goods is contemplated between the
parties, and, by the contract of sale, the goods are to be delivered at fixed dates
on the receipt of the vendee's notes, on the delivery of the notes, the right of
stoppage in trausitu does not exist.
It is immaterial that the goods are immediately put by the vendee upon their
transit to a distant place, or that the fact that they were to be so transmitted
was known to the vendor, provided that the transit was not named to the vendor
at the time of the contract.
Where goods are in bond for duties, they may be sold subject to the lien of the
United States. If the vendor consents to a withdrawal for transhipment, and
the vendee executes the customary bond for that purpose, the right of stoppage
in transitu can no longer be exercised by the vendor.
]ven assuming that the right of stoppage in transitu continued as between
the vendor and the vendee, it is lost if the vendee assigns to an honest purchaser
a bill of lading of the goods given to himself on his own transhj"pment. If a loan
is made to the vendee on the faith of an assignment of the bill of lading, which
is executed several days after the loan, the delay being incidental to the transhipment, the loan is incontemplation of law made upon the bill of lading, and
the lender can claim the rights of a purchaser in good faith.
A., a foreign railroad corporation, having an office in New York, and an executive committee with full power to transact its business, made a contract
through its committee with B., for the purchase of a large quantity of railroad
iron. The iron was to be delivered at a fixed time on the reception of the company's notes with certain collateral securities. The notes and securities having
"ieen given accordingly, a part of the iron on shipboard in port was withdrawn
from bond by B.'s consent, and a bond given by A. to the United States to secure
the payment of duties, as a condition of transhipment to Milwaukie. While the
transhipment was proceeding, A. borrowed money from C. on the faith of the
bill of lading. This was not executed until several days after the loan, owing
to the fact that the shipment was to be made on a number of vessels, and the
bill of lading was not to be executed until all the vessels were laden. The bill
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of lading having been made out to A., and assigned by A. to C., Held, that on A.'s
insolvency B. could not exercise the right of stoppage in transitu.
B. having taken possession of the iron by a proceeding analogous to a writ of
replevin, held that he might be treated by C. as a trespasser.
It seems that the sureties in the replevin bond might also be treated as cotrespassers.

Appeal from the Superior Court of New York.
Daniel Lord and Lutter R. Mfarsh, for appellants.
William H. .Evarts, for respondents.
The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the Court, which
was delivered by
DAVIES, J.-The defendants, Vose, Livingston, and Perkins,
were, in June 1857, merchants doing business in the city of New
York under the firm of Vose, Livingston & Co. Previous thereto, a corporation bad been created by the Legislature of the state
of Wisconsin, under the corporate name of The Chicago, St. Paul
and Fond-du-Lac Railroad Company, for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and operating a railroad from Chicago, in the
state of Illinois, through Janesville and Fond-du-Lac to Lake
Superior, a distance in all of about 500 miles. For the facility
of transacting its business, the company established an office in
the city of New York, and it would appear to have been established as early as April 6, 1857. The powers of the executive
committee, located in New York and having charge of the office
there, seem to have been full and ample, to make contracts for
the company, to borro 4 money on its account, to cause a mortgage to be given upon any or all the property of the company,
and, in general, to manage its business affairs. By a resolution
of the board of directors, any two of the committee, with the
president of the board, were'authorized to transact business.
During the summer of 1857, and for the period covered by
the transactions between the parties to this suit, Win. B. Ogden
was* the president of the company, Charles Butler the treasurer,
and J. W. Hickok, vice president, and with William C. Langley,
composed the executive committee at this time.
They all resided in the city of New York, and the committee
were in the practice of meeting at the office of the company in
that city during the summer of 1857, and then transacting the
business of the company; and it appears that, during that period, the persons above named were the acting officers of that
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company in that city, by whom its business was principally
transacted.
On the 22d of June 1857, Vose, Livingston & Co. entered
into a contract in the city of New York, with said railroad company, through its executive comnittee, whereby they sold to the
company 2000 tons of railroad iron, at 52 dollars per ton in
bond, payable in the notes of the company at four, six, and eight
months from the delivery of the iron-that is, from the commencement of the delivery of each parcel, one-third each, with interest
at seven per cent. The contract declared that one thousand
tons of the iron was then in port, and that the same was to be
delivered from the first to fifteenth of July, and the balance to
arrive in the latter part of July or in August. As collateral security for the payment of the notes, the eight per cent. first
mortgage construction bonds of the company, of the par value
of twice the amount of the notes, were to be lodged with Vose,
Livingston & Co., who were to have the power, in case of the
non-payment of the notes, to sell said bonds or enough to realize
the amount due on the unpaid note or notes, on giving notice to
the company or its agent in New York.
The delivery was to be from the commencement of each parcel.
The iron was imported into the port of New York by Vose, Livingston & Co., in the ship National, andwas on board that ship in
bond at the time the contract of sale was made. A bill of parcels was made out by Vose, Livingston & Co., for 1300 tons of
iron, it having been ascertained that there was that quantity on
the ship, instead of 1000 tons, as mentioned in the contract of
sale, drawn up on June 21st, headed "Chicago, St. Paul and
Fond-du-Lac R. R. Co., to Vose, Livingston & Co. for railroad
iron delivered under contract of 22d June, 1857," specifying
the quantity of iron, and enumerating the notes to be given
therefor, amounting, with interest thereon, to $69,976.94, and
at the bottom it reads as follows: " To be secured by a deposit
of 140 of the company's first mortgage construction bonds. E.
E., New York, 22d June 1857." It is manifest that this bill
of parcels must have been delivered to the company as a memorandum for it to prepare and execute the requisite notes. By
the terms of the original contract of sale, the iron was to-be delivered to the company from first to fifteenth July. On the
first of July, the deputy collector of the port issued a permit to
the storekeeper of the port, in whose custody and care the ship
National was, stating that a bond had been given for the delivery
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of the iron at the port of
-,
withdrawn for transportation by
the company, to be marked port of New York, in bond for MuIwaukie, which was imported by Yose, Livingston & Co. in the National, June 17, 1857, and stating therein c you will deliver the
same." On the 25th of June, 1857,.Hickok, the vice-president of
the company, and one of the executive committee, made an entry at
the custom-house in New York, which stated that the said railroad
iron was intended to be withdrawn from warehouse by the said railroad company for transportation to Milwaukie, and marked "per
Troy and Oswego line to Oswego, thence, per sailing vessel, to Milwaukie, consigned to T. F. Johnson," and which was signed by
Hickok; and at the foot thereof was this memorandum: ,We
authorize Chicago, St. Paul and Fond-du-Lac R. R. Co. to withdraw from warehouse the goods described in this entry. YosE,
LIVINGSTON & CO."

The circumstances disclosed make it clear, I think, that this
authorization to withdraw the iron from the custom-house was not
given till on or after the third of July, when the vendors received
payment for it, and that it is to be regarded as the equivalent
of the delivery order.
On the 3d of July, the railroad company made and executed
the bond required by the laws of the United States where goods
are withdrawn from warehouse at a port of entry to be transported in bond to another port of entry within the United States,
and at which latter port the duties of importation are to be paid;
which bond was in the penal sum of $103,168, and had a condition that if the obligors should, within ninety days or such
further time as the Secretary of the Treasury might allow,
transport via the canal, &c., the said railroad iron, and should
deliver the same to the collector of the port of Milwaukie, and
deliver within a reasonable time to the collector of the port of
New York a certificate of the collector of the port of Milwaukie,
that said iron had been so delivered to him, or, failing so to do,
should pay to the collector of the port of New York the duties
to be'ascertained as due and owing on said merchandise, and an
additional duty of one hundred per cent., imposed by the Act of
Congress of 28th of March 1854: then'the obligation was to be
The permit had indorsed
void, otherwise to remain in force.
thereon, "centered July 3d 1857 ; delivered, H. H. J." The
receipt appended to the bill of parcels, made out June 23d, is in
these words :-
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" Received payment, by notes four, six, and eight months, from
July 3d 1857, and 140 bonds, as collateral for the within.
"VoSE,

LIVINGSTON & CO.,

t, Per GEO. F. BATE.
"New York, July 6th, 1857."
The railroad company employed the Troy and Oswego Line to
take said railroad iron from the ship National in New York, and
to transport it for them to Milwaukie, and the quantity there to
be taken was that described in the bill of parcels, receipted for
by Vose, Livingston & Co., consisting of 7338 bars. The bars
were put on board the canal-boats of that line from the ship
National, and 2283 were put on board boats on the 10th July,
and the balance on boats on the 11th, 18th, 17th, 20th, and 21st
days of July. In the early part of July, members of the executive committee of the company applied to the plaintiffs for a loan
of money, and on the 10th of July the plaintiffs loaned the company $50,000 in their notes, on the hypothecation of said iron.
The executive committee, under date of July 10th, made an order
authorizing Hickok, their vice-president, to borrow of the plaintiffs
that sum, and to hypothecate the said 1300 tons of railroad iron,
imported per ship National, and which they stated in said order
were then in the course of transhipment from the port of New
York to Milwaukie, consigned to S. F. Johnson, engineer; and
subjoined thereto was a statement signed by Hickok, as vicepresident, that he had that day (July 10th) notified S. F. Johnson, Esq., of the order for 1300 tons iron given to Messrs. Holbrook and Nelson. At the time the notes were advanced by
plaintiffs to the company, they received from the company a paper
dated July 10th 1857, stating that the company had purchased
and paid for 1300 tons of railroad iron, as per invoice therewith,
imported per ship National, and now discharging from said vessil
under permit of the United States custom-house, for its transhipment from New York to Milwaukie, subject to delivery there to
S. F. Johnson, engineer of said road, on payment of duties
*thereon. In consideration that the said company had that day borrowed of the plaintiffs, on the security of said iron, $50,000, said
company transferred said iron to said plaintiffs as security for the
payment of that sum, and delivered therewith an order on the
consignee aforesaid for the delivery of said iron. The said order
authorized and requested Johnson to deliver to the order of the
plaintiffs the whole or any part of said iron, and to transfer all
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title to the same to them. These papers were all delivered to
the plaintiffs at the time, and upon the faith of which they made
the loan. On the 22d of July, all the railroad iron being then
on the boats of the Troy and Oswego Line, that company issued
a receipt or bill of lading in these words: "Troy and Oswego
Line Office, 167 Broad street. Proprietors, L. B. Crocker & Co.,
Oswego. Received, New York,
July 22d 1857, from ship National, the following articles on
board boat, viz. : seven thousand
three hundred and thirty-six bars railroad iron (7336 rails)."
It contained stipulations on the part of the carriers and shippers, and was signed "cFor the Troy and Oswego Line. GEo.
JENNISoN, agent."
On the same day there was indorsed on the back thereof an
assignment and transfer, by the company to the plaintiffs, of the
iron therein mentioned as collateral security for their notes
advanced to the company to the extent of $50,000, as per agreement dated July 10th 1857. The bill of lading and assignment
were delivered to the plaintiffs on the day of their date. It was
stated to the plaintiffs previously and on the 10th of July, that
the bill of lading could not be given until the entire parcel was
put on the boats, and that it would then cover the whole, and
when received the company promised to deliver it to them. On
the 1st of August following, Jennison, the agent of the canal line,
indorsed on the bill of lading a recognition of the transfer of the
property mentioned therein to the plaintiffs. It does not distinctly appear when the boats laden with the iron left the city of
New York. On the 25th of July some paper of the compaiy
went to protest, and on the let of August Vose, Livingston & Co.
notified Jennison, the agent of the carriers in the city of New
York, that the 1300 tons of iron taken from the ship National
was their property, and on the 3d of August the carriers at
Oswego were notified of the claim of Vose, Livingston & Co.
On the 4th of August, summons and complaint, affidavits, undertaking and requisition in an action to iecover the possession of
said iron by Vose, Livingston & Co., were placed in the hands
of the sheriff of Oswego county, and by virtue of which he took
said iron and delivered it to them. The defendants Dawson &
Brown were the sureties in the undertaking, and justified as
such. This suit was commenced against all the defendants,Vose,
Marked,
Chicago, St. Paul,
Fond-du-Lac Ralroad Co.
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Livingston & Co. and Dawson & Brown, for the forcible and
wrongful taking of said property, and to recover the value thereof with interest. The judge of the Supreme Court before whom
the cause was tried, dismissed the complaint, and judgment was
entered for defendants, and which, on appeal, was affirmed at the
General Term. The plaintiffs appeal to this court. Vose, Livingston & Co. claim to hold the iron in controversy by the exercise of their right of stoppage in transitu-a right given by law
to a vendor on the happening of the insolvency of the vendee, before delivery, actual or constructive, to resume and enforce his lien
for the price of the goods sold, by retaking them. Parsons's definition of the right is, - If a vendor, who has sent goods to a purchaser at a distance, finds that the purchaser is insolvent, he may
stop the goods at any time before they reach the purchaser. This
right is called the right of stoppage in transitu." Parsons on Con.,
vol. 1, p. 476. The right to stop goods in transitu, though first
introduced and founded in equity, has long been considered and
acted upon as a legal rule. The circumstances under which this
right may be exercised are clearly and succinctly stated by Chancellor WALWORTH, in Covell vs. Hitchcock, in the Court of Errors,
23 Wend. 611. He says: "The law appears to be well settled
that the right of stoppage in transitu exists so long as the goods remain in the hands of a middleman on the way to the place of their
destination, and that the right terminates whenever the goods are
or have been either actually or constructively delivered to the vendee ; a delivery to the general agent of the vendee is, of course,
tantamount to a delivery to himself. The time during which the right
exists, therefore, is during the whole period of the transit from the
vendor to the purchaser, or the place of ultimate destination as
designated to the vendor by the buyer; and this transit continues
so long as the goods remain in the possession of the middleman,
whether he be the carrier either by land or by water, or the
keeper of a warehouse or place of deposit connected with the
transmission and delivery of the goods."
The doctrine as applicable to this subject is well stated by Bell, in his Contracts of
Sale, p. 122. He says that it is reducible to the following
propositions :1. That the delivery is not complete, nor the possession of the
seller terminated, till the goods have come within the power and
disposal of the buyer.
2. That till this has taken place, the seller has a right to direct
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the goods to be withheld by the carrier, wharfinger, or other
middle man, in whose hands they may be, for the purpose of being
forwarded to the buyer.
3. That the seller's right so exercised is grounded in equity,
not on the footing of the contract being dissolved, but as a just
security for the price; the goods so stopped being in the hands
of the middleman no otherwise than they would have been in
the seller's own hands, if they had not left his premises, that is
under lien for the price.
4. That the consequence of this is, to give to the buyer or his
creditors a right to insist for delivery of the goods on tendering
the price; and to the seller a right to demand the price as a debt,
secured by real lien on the goods.
5. That the right of the seller cannot be exercised to the prejudice of any third party, who bond fide have received from the buyer
a transference by bill of lading, or other negotiable instrument.
' It is thus seen that the right exists, until the g6ods have
arrived at the place of destination named by the buyer to the
seller, the place directed by the former, to which the latter is to
send them; and the transit spoken of in the cases, is the passing
over of the goods from the seller, to this designated or named
place. It is often difficult to determine whether the goods, -which
it is sought to stop, are still in transitu. Parsons says, " The
general rule is, that they are so not only while in motion, and not
only while in the actual possession of the carrier (although he
was appointed and specified by the consignee), but also while they
are deposited in any place connected with the transmission ofthem, or rather while in any place, not actually or constructively
the place of the consignee, or so in his possession or under his
control, that the putting them there implies the intention of delivery." Parsons on Contracts, vol. 1, p. 482. A case can hardly
occur for the exercise of this right, except when the vendor and
vendee are residents of different localities, and the goods are
purchased by order, with directions to forward them by the seller
to the purchaser at his place of residence or business, or to some
agent of his at another locality.
ASHURST, J., says, in Liekbarrow vs. Mason, 2 Term Rep. 71,
"Where a man sells goods, he sells them on the credit of the
buyer; if he delivers the goods the property is altered, and he
cannot recover them back again, though'the vendee immediately
becomes a bankrupt. But, when the delivery is to be at a distant
VOL. XIII-39
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place, as between the vendor and vendee, the contract is ambulatory till delivery, and, therefore, in case of insolvency of the
vendee in the mean time, the vendor may stop the goods in transitu." An examination of the cases will show, as already observed, that the question of stoppage in transitu can rarely, if
ever, arise, when the vendor and vendee are in the same place,
and the property sold is to be delivered there, as such delivery
almost immediately follows the sale, and there is in fact no
transit.
All the cases concede, that even in case of a transit, from the
vendor to the vendee, set in motion by the former, from the place
of purchase to that of ulterior destination named by the vendee
to the vendor, a delivery of the goods to the vendee, or his agent,
before the exercise of the right of stoppage in transitu, whether
actual or constructive or symbolical, terminates the right. The
controversy in the cases, therefore, turns upon the questions,
first, is there a transit ? second, has there been a delivery of any
kind, to the vendee or his agent, before the goody reach the
point of ulterior destination named by the vendee to the vendor ?
Before proceeding to an examination of the cases, it may be
well to advert to the facts in the present case. The vendors and
the vendees, at the time of the sale in this case, were both transacting business in the city of New York. The former resided
there, and it does not appear had any other residence or place of
business. The railroad cQmpany, the vendees, had an office there,
and all its affairs and business were managed by an executive
committee, all of whom resided there, and there transacted its
business. The vendors and vendees in this case were, therefore,
of the same locality. The contract of sale of June 22d 1857did not refer to the company as located elsewhere, except, perhaps, in the latter clause, as to notice to be given of the sale of
the bonds, which, it is stated, was to be to the company or its
agent in New York: The notes given for the purchase-money
were to be dated New York, the delivery of the iron to the vei4dees was to be made there, and the notes were to be dated as of
the day of delivery, and which, as to this parcel of iron, was'to
be from the 1st to the 15th of July. No place of ulterior destination was named by the vendees to the vendors. And if it is
assumed that the vendors understood that the vendees intended
to transport the iron to Milwaukee, for use or sale there, those
circumstances made no difference, as will be conclusively shown
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by cases hereafter cited. The delivery to the vendees was made
and completed on the 3d of July, in the city of New York, at
which time they gave their notes for the purchase price of the
iron, and the collateral security called for by the contract, and
the company or its agents then took the actual possession and
control of the iron. Hammond vs. Anderson, 4 Bos. & Pull. 68,
was a controversy between the assignees of the bankrupt and the
vendor of the goods. At the time of the sale of the goods, they
were on the wharf of the defendant. The purchaser took away
a portion, and before the residue was delivered became a bankrupt, and the vendors claimed to stop the residue. Sir JAMES
MANSFIELD, C. J., said: cc As to those bales which were sent away,
the bankrupt had taken actual possession, and therefore no question can arise; and when it is admitted that he had taken a part,
how can it be said he had not taken the whole ? The price was
entire, and the whole to be paid for in one bill." HEATH, J.,
said the contract was entire, and part having been taken away,
the privilege of stopping in tran8itu could not attach. RooKE,
J.-"-The whole of the goods was paid for by one bill; a general
order was given for the delivery of the whole, and the purchaser,
Under that order, went and took away a part-how could'he more
effectually change the possession ?" CHAMBRE, J., said it was
a much stronger case than Slubey vs. Heyward, 2 H. B. 504,
whie& proceeded upon the principle that a delivery of part was a
detvery of the whole. But here was'tin actual delivery of the
whole. There, the person who made the delivery, delivered a part
out of the ship. Bat here the bankrupt bad actual manual possession of every article, and having weighed them all, he took
upon himself to separate them. It was clear that the original
vendor had no claim.
Harmer vs. Meyer, 6 East 614, was a case of a purchase of
goods (a quantity of starch) where vendor and vendee resided in
the same place. The order given by the vendor to the person
having the starch sold in his possession, was to weigh and deliver
all Air-tarch. A portion was weighed and delivered to the vendee
before insolvency, and the question arose between his assignees
and the vendor, which was entitled to the portion not weighed, and
it was held that the vendor still retained it, and that till it was
weighed, his agents were not authorized to deliver it. Lord
ELLENBOROUGH said: cc If anything remain to be done on the part
of the seller, as between him and the buyer, before the commodity
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purchased is to be delivered, a complete present right of property
has not attached in the buyer."
Meletopulo vs. Banking was a case before Lord LYNDHURST, and
is reported in 1 N. Y. Legal Observer, p. 299. One Sargint
commissioned the plaintiff to purchase at different places a cargo
of currants, which were to be shipped at Vostizza for England.
The currants were accordingly purchased, and sent to Vostizza,
and a vessel was chartered by Sargint, who gave directions to
send them in to Ranking. Lord Chancellor held that if the
plaintiff had been ordered to buy and ship them to England, he
might have stopped them in their transit, because the transit
would not have been ended until his order was completed. The
currants were to be delivered at Vostizza and then shipped.
That the sole question was, whether there was a delivery to
Sargint at Vostizza. The bill of lading is the material fact, and
that states the goods were for Sargint. It was true that they
were in fact put on board the ship by the plaintiff, and the question was by whom they were shipped, not who put them on board,
and the lord chancellor held that the shipment being made by
Sargint, put an end to the right to stop in transitu.
Barrettvs. Goddard,3 Mason C. 0. Rep. 107, is a case where
the right of stoppage was set up. The seller and buyer both resided in Boston, and the former sold to the latter forty-one bales
of cotton then being in the seller's warehouse. As an inducement to the purchase, the seller agreed that the cotton might remain there as long as it suited the convenience of the buyer
The buyer gave his note to the defendant, the seller, for the
amount of the sale at eight months, and received a bill of parcels,
receipted by the note. The buyer did not go even to the warehouse to see the cotton. Before the note became due, the buyer
became insolvent, and made an assignment to plaintiff, who claimed
the cotton of defendant, and he refused to deliver it, setting up
his right to stop in transitu. Judge STORY, in delivering the
opinion of the court, says the d~ctrine of Hammond vs. A-nderson,
supra, has never been denied, and he holds that the converse doctrine flows from the same principle, and that is: that where no
further act remains to be done on either side, and the thing sold
is separated and distinguished from all others, as soon as the terms
of the contract are completed and complied with, the property
passes. Applying these principles to that case, Judge STORY
said nothing remained to be done on either side. The bales were
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all marked and numbered, and sold by the marks and numbers.
They were perfectly distinguishable from all others, and the terms
of the contract on the other side were fully complied with. The
payment was made in the mode agreed on, by giving a note payable at a future day. Neither party contemplated any further
act to be done. He adds : "The other points as to the lien and
right of stoppage in transitu may be disposed of in a few words.
The very contract itself repels the notion of a lien. The goods
were deliverable immediately at the option of the vendee. The
payment was by a note on time. Now, giving such a credit for
the price under such circumstances, is decisive against any implied right of retainer or lien for the price ? How, then, can
the court assert one, when it is inconsistent with the very terms
of the bargain ? Besides, if this delivery was complete, there is
necessarily an end of the lien. The transit would be ended,
and the right of stoppage in transitu, once gone, could not be
reassumed." The plaintiff had judgment.
Orawhllay vs. Eades, 1 B. & C. 181, shows that when a carrier has begun to deliver to the consignee, but stops in the course
of it, his special property remains till the freight for the whole
cargo is either tendered or paid, or till he has parted with the
possession of the whole; then, as a consequence, the consignor is
not divested of his right to stop in transitu.
In this case, ABBOTT, 0. J., says the whole question was, whether
there had been a delivery or not; and BAYLEY, J., said: , It is
quite clear that if the iron was once completely delivered, the
transitus was at an end."
Allen vs. Gripper, 2 Tyrw. Rep. 217, was tried before LYNDHURST, C. B., at the London sittings, and the facts appearing
were that one Pestall, through a broker, purchased of the plaintiff a quantity of oil-cakes. The cakes were shipped at Twickenham, on the Thames, to be conveyed down the river to the
mouth of the Lea, then to be transhipped into the defendants'
barges to be carried along the Lea to Hertford, where the defendants resided. No water-carriage existed between the latter
place and Baldock. The cakes arrived at Hertford, and were
placed in defendants' warehouse. It appeared that oil-cake consigned to Pestall, from the Thames, had for some time been warehoused there for sale, without ever having been sent to Baldock.
The cakes were taken into the defendants' warehouse on the 20th
of December, Pestall having became insolvent on the 15th, and
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on the former day the plaintiff claimed to stop the cakes. The
jury found for the defendants, adding that they considered
the goods were intended to be left at the defendants' warehouse,
as a place of general deposit, for the convenience of sale, and
were not to be taken home to Pestall's house. BAYLEY, J., says:
"In this case, it appears to me that the original transitus ended
when the goods reached the warehouse in which the consignee
intended them to be deposited to abide further orders from him,
without which they would remain stationary. The right to stop
in transitu was therefore gone." And he held this case was clearly
distinguishable from that of Crawshlay vs. Eades, supra.
Wentworth vs. Outhwaite, 10 M. & W. 436, was elaborately
argued, and the question turnedupon the fact whether the transitus was at an end. One Weatherall, of Michley Mills, a place
about thirty miles from Leeds, purchased twenty mats of flax
from Hill & Co., of Hull, and they were forwarded by railway to
Leeds, and duly arrived at the warehouse of the defendants, who
were carriers, and Weatherall sent his carts and took away ten
of the mats. Weatherall having become bankrupt, Hill & Co.
claimed to stop the remaining ten mats in defendant's warehouse,
as in transit. The jury, in answer to a question put by the
learned judge, found that the parties contemplated that the flax
was to be used for the purpose of manufacture at Michley Mills.
PARKE, Baron, concurred with Lord ABINGER, Chief Baron, that
the transitus was at an end. He says: , It may be considered
as having been at an end, both because the goods had come into the
constructive possession of the vendee, and because they had arrived at their place of destination."
Dodson vs. Wentworth, 4 Man. & Gran. 555, is another case
growing out of the bankruptcy of the same person mentioned in
the preceding case. In this case the plaintiff was a flax merchant
in London, and for many years had dealings with Weatherall of
Michley Mills, about thirteen miles from Boroughbridge, in Yorkshire. The goods which Weatherall purchased from the plaintiff
usually were sent by sea to York or Hull, and thence by canal to
Boroughbridge, and from thence conveyed to Michley Mills, sometimes by a carrier, and sometimes in Weatherall's own carts.
The flax in controversy was shipped on board a vessel bound for
Boroughbridge, "to be delivered at the aforesaid port of Boroughbridge unto Mr. Thomas Weatherall, Michley Mills, near Ripon,
or to his assigns, he or they paying freight for the said goods
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15s. per ton, delivered free in Boroughbridge." The Laurel
arrived at York, and the flax was transhipped into a boat belonging to the Ripon Fly-boat Company, which conveyed goods by
canal, and the flax was landed from the fly-boat at Boroughbridge,
and was lodged there, in a warehouse there belonging to the Ouse
Navigation Company, which had no connection with the other
company. Weatherall never claimed the flax or exercised any
act of ownership over it. The plaintiff claimed that the transitus
was not at an end, and that his right of stoppage had been properly exercised. TiNDAL, C. J., said it was not immaterial to
observe, that the warehouse in which the goods were lodged was
not the warehouse of the carrier, as some of the cases turn upon
the point, that the transitu8 is not at an end while the goods
remain in the possession of the barrier, not only in the actual
course of the journey or voyage, but even while they are in a
place of deposit connected with their transmission. He further
says, that the state of facts very closely resembles that'in -Dixon
is. Baldwin, where it was laid down that the delivery of goods
to the appointed agents of the vendee, from whom the agents
were to receive orders as to the ultimate destination of the goods,
puts an end to the right of stoppage in transitu. MAULE, J.,
said, "6the duty of the carriers was at an end, when they had
brought the goods to Boroughbridge and had delivered them
there to the vendee, or to some person on his behalf. * *
think it quite clear, that under all the circumstances, upon the
delivery at the warehouse of the Ouse Navigation Company, the
right of the consignor to stop these goods was at an end."
Valp2y vs. Gib8on, 4 C. B. 837 (56 E. C. L. R. 835), presents
many features like the case now under consideration, and the
doctrine of which is pertinent to it. In that case, Brown, a
merchant at Birmingham, bought goods of Gibson, Ord & Co.,
merchants of Manchester, to ship to Valparaiso. On the 20th
March 1844, the goods were, by Brown's direction, sent to a firm
of shipping agents at Liverpool, employed by Brown to receive
and forward them to Valparaiso, and on the same day the vendors
wrote to the shipping agents advising them of the transmission
of patterns, which they requested them to ship with the goods,
cc as Brown might direct them to be shipped." The goods were,
on the 4th of April, shipped by the shipping agents on board a
vessel bound for Valparaiso, and were afterwards relanded, by
order of a member of the house at Valparaiso to which they were
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consigned by Brown, and sent to the vendor's house at Manchester, for the purpose of being repacked in smaller cases.
WILDE, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said:
" With regard to the right of stoppage in transitu, it appears to
us, that, though the defendants knew the goods were to be sent
to Valparaiso, and so informed Leech, Harrison & Co. (the shipping agents) when they forwarded them to Liverpool, yet that
Leech, Harrison & Co.- could not simply on that information forward the goods to Valparaiso, but that they held them subject to
such orders as Brown might give as to forwarding them to
Valparaiso or elsewhere, and the transituswas consequently at an
end as soon as the goods came to the hands of Leech, Harrison
& Co. But when Leech, Harrison & Co., by the order of Brown,
relanded the goods, and by order of Allison (who must be taken
to have acted under the authority of Brown) sent them to the
defendants to be repacked, the possession of the goods, as well
as the property, vested in Brown, who, in causing them to be
relanded and sent to the defendants, dealt with the goods as
owner ; and this would certainly put an end to the transitus,even
if it had not been determined, as we think it was, by the original
delivery to Leech, Harrison & Co."
Another controlling case, in my view, is that of Cowasjee vs.
Thomson, 5 Moore Priv. Council 165. It was an appeal from
the court at Bombay, by Cowasjee, a Parsee merchant residing
there. Respondents were merchants in London, and the appellant was the sole owner of the ship Buckinghamshire. On the
12th November 1841, while the ship was lying in the India Dock,
London, in charge of the ship's husband and manager, employed
by the appellant, the respondents employed their lighterman to
put on board the ship the pigs of lead in question, in two parcels,
and the manager received from the respondents, with the lead,
two forms of receipt, written wholly by their clerk'; to which he
affixed his signature, and they were returned by the lighterman
to the respondents, and they retained possession of them. On
the 18th of December 1841, the firm of Boggs, Taylor & Co., who
were the real shippers of the lead, and the purchasers of it from
Thomson & Co., became insolvent, and on the 20th and 29th of
December, while the lead was still on board the ship in the docks,
it was demanded of the manager of the ship. The bill of Boggs,
Taylor & Co., accepted by them for the price of the lead, was
dishonored when it fell due. On the part of the appellant, it
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appeared that on the 80th of October 1841, the 'respondents contracted to sell to Boggs, Taylor & Co. 100 tons of lead "free on
board at Y20 per ton, six months acceptance, or 2i per cent.
discount for cash, at the option of B., T. & Co.," and that the lead
was shipped in pursuance of the contract. On the 2d of November 1841, B., T. & Co. addressed a letter to Dickenson & Co.,
requesting them to insure the lead, and to accept two bills for
£1500 each, one dated October 29th 1841, the other November
1st 1841, at six months, on the faith that B., T. & Co. would
place in their hands the lead in question, or the bills of lading
relating thereto, and which bills were accepted by Dickenson &
Co. on the 2d of November, and before the shipment, and were
paid at maturity. On the 16th, the captain of the ship, without
requiring the return of the mate's receipts, signed four bills of
lading dated November 15th, prepared by B., T. & Co., describing
the lead as shipped by them and to be delivered to B. & A.
Hormajee or their assigns, and which bills of lading were indorsed
by B., T. & Co. to Dickenson & Co. On the 26th November,
B., T. & Co. declined to pay cash for the lead, and accepted a
draft therefor at six months dated November 12th. The court
at Bombay adjudged that the lead belonged to the respondents.
From this decision the appellant appealed to the Queen in Council,
and contended that the transit was completed by the shipment
of the lead. That it was a complete delivery within the terms
of the contract, and the right to stop in transitu did not exist
after such delivery on board. of the ship, although it was well
known it was put there to go to a foreign port. Lord BROUGHAM,
who gave the opinion of the judicial committee of the Privy
Council, said the argument of the respondent and the court below
was that the mate's receipts were never given up by respondents
to B., T. & Co., and that therefore the sale was not complete,
the delivery Was imperfect, something remained to be done, and
the transaction was not finished nor the transitus determined.
He said they were clearly of the opinion that the non-delivery
of the receipts can have no operation whatever, for the plain
reason that it was the clear and bounden duty of the respondents
to have delivered them up, and it would be preposterous in them
that they should avail themselves of their own wrong. He observed: "Does not the taking of that acceptance, which was by
the contract only to be given by the purchaser on the delivery of
the goods, and to be given for each parcel as delivered, at once
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show that the delivery was completed, that nothing remained to
be done, that the goods had reached their journey's end, and that
they were no longer in transitu to be stopped ? The question in
all the cases between buyer and seller, which is the case here, is
whether or not anything remained to be done as between these
two parties. The importance of keeping that in view, whether
the question arises between these two parties, or between one of
them and a third party, is well stated by LE BLANC, J., in Burk
vs. Davis, 2 M. & S. 404, and in W-hitehouse vs. Frost, 12 East
621. In the present case it is quite clear, that nothing remained
to be done between the buyer and the seller, unless it be that the
latter ought most certainly to have delivered up the master's
receipt, which he wrongfully or by oversight kept possession of,
without the shadow of a right to it, and whether it be wrong or
error, he is not the party to take advantage of it." Judgment
of the court of Bombay was reversed.
Bowley vs. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 307, is an instructive case. The
facts were, that one Martin purchased of the plaintiffs, in the
city of New York, he then also residing and being there, two
thousand bushels of corn, then on board the sloop Milan, whereof one of the plaintiffs was master. It was measured and delivered on board the ship Lion, employed by Martin, consigned to
defendants at Boston. It was shipped on the 25th of May, and on
the same day the Lion left for Boston. On her arrival in Boston, she was boarded, and the corn demanded on behalf of the
plaintiffs, on the ground that it bad been fraudulently obtained
from them. The defendants offered in evidence a bill of lading,
dated 17th May, signed by the master of the Lion, purporting to
be for two thousand bushels of corn, shipped by Martin, and consigned to defendants ; and an invoice from Martin to them to sell
the same ; and a letter from Martin to them, dated the 17th May,
annexed to the invoice and bill of lading, advising them that he
had drawn on them a bill for $1000, on account of the shipment.
On the 20th of May, defendants accepted the draft and paid it at
maturity. SHAW, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court,
says: "The right of stoppage in transituis nothing more than
an extension of the right of lien, which, by the common law, the
vendor has upon the goods for the price, originally allowed in
equity, and subsequently adopted as a rule of law. By a bargain
and sale without delivery, the property vests in the vendee; but
where, by the terms of sale, the price is to be paid on delivery,
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the vendor has a right to retain the goods till payment is made,
and this right is strictly a lien, a right to detain and hold the
goods of another as security for the payment of some debt, or
the performance of some duty. But where the vendor and vendee are at some distance from each other, and the goods are on
their way from the vendor to the vendee, or to the place by him
appointed for their delivery; if the vendee become insolvent, and
the vendor can repossess himself of the goods before they have
reached the hands of the vendee or the place of destination, he
has a right so to do, and thereby regain his lien. This only
restores the vendor's lien, and can only take place when the property has vested in the vendee." And the court held there was
no right of stoppage in transitu in that case.
-ollingsworth vs. Napier, 3 Caine's Cases 182, was an action
of trover, to recover the value of ten bales of cotton, which
the defendant had sold to one Kinworthy, then lying in a
public store at the quarantine, in New York, for cash, payable
on delivery. A bill of parcels had been made out and marked
" cash" on the margin, but no receipt for the money. This, together with an order on the storekeeper for the cotton, had been
given to the purchaser, who, without paying for the articles,
transferred the bill of parcels and order to the plaintiff, who paid
him therefor. At the trial, the jury, under the direction of the
judge that the order to the storekeeper was a delivery, found for
the plaintiff. On a motion for a new trial, SPENCER, J., delivering the opinion of the court, says : " The plaintiff having, as it
must now be intended, gotten possession of the order for the cotton, received a delivery of it, and paid the storage. This acquiring of possession took away the defendant's right to stop in
tran8itu. The order itself is a delivery so as to prevent the
operation of the statute. But again, the sale is wholly free from
that objection, by the delivery of possession under it."
But the facts in the present case are much stronger than those
appearing in the cases just referred to. In the present case, the
iron sold was in New York, on board the ship National, having
been imported by the sellers, and being on shipboard in bond, in
custody of the custom-house officers ; the seller and buyer, both
being in the city of New York, and transacting business there.
The terms of sale were notes of the buyer at four, six, and eight
months from the commencement of the delivery of the iron, to
be secured by bonds of the company as collateral. The quantity
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on the ship National having been ascertained to be thirteen hundred tons, a bill of parcels was made out, and receipt of payment
therefor, in the notes and the collateral security, as called for by
the contracts, was signed by the seller as of the 3d July. Previous thereto, the sellers had given a written authority to the
buyer to withdraw the iron from the custom-house, and on the 3d
of July it was withdrawn and delivered to the buyer. Was not
this a complete, actual, and effectual delivery to the buyer ? If
not, it is difficult to ascertain what would have made it more so.
Clearly, nothing more was to be done between seller and buyer.
The former had obtained his contract price for the article sold in
the form and according to the terms of his contract, and had
receipted payment of the bill of parcels, and had given an order
on the custodian, to deliver the article sold to the buyer. This
order had been accepted and executed, and forthwith, and on the
10th of July, the article began to be shipped on vessels employed
by and paid for by the buyer. The seller had no longer any
control over, or any right of interference with the thing sold;
and the buyer had not only the actual possession of the thing sold,
previous to any assertion by the seller of the right of stoppage
in transitu, but it had come even, in the language of the judges,
to his -corporal touch."
But it is urged, that the iron sold being in bond at the time of
sale, and so continuing, could not come to the possession of the
buyer-that the possessidn continued in the United States; we
think there is no force in this objection. This court held in
Waldron vs. Romaine, 22 N. Y. Rep. 368, that the property in
goods sold in bond in New York, passes to the purchaser upon
delivery to a carrier selected by the vendee, although they remain
subject to lien for duties, and to the custody of the officers of the
customs, until authority to pass them is received at the port of
exportation, and which authority in that case the vendor volunteered to take the requisite steps for obtaining. The court said,
in its opinion, to be sure the defendant could not take absolute
possession of it until it passed to Canada, without first satisfying
the claim of the United States government. In other words, he
bought it subject to a contingent lien, as people every day buy
personal and real property subject to a pledge or mortgage.
Nevertheless, their ownership in the thing is complete and absolute, subject to the lien or the qualified ownership of the pledgee
or mortgagee. Beyond all doubt, they could sell it to any other
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person, still subject to the pledge or mortgage, without asking
permission from their seller or vendor." The vendibility of the
property was not destroyed by its being subject to the lien,
neither did that circumstance impair the absolute title and ownership of the purchaser. The present case is even stronger for the
purchaser than that. There the seller had made the withdrawal
entry and given the bond, to export the sugar to Canada, or pay
the duties required, in case of home comsumption. In this case
the purchaser made the withdrawal entry, and gave the bond for
the transportation to another port in the United States, and to pay
the legal duties there. This bond was accepted as a substitute
for the duties, which the purchaser has thus in fact paid. He
bought subject to the duties due on the importation of the iron,
and took possession thereof subject only to these, and in securing
these duties the seller took no part.
In Afottram vs. Beyer, 1 Denio 483, the goods were ordered by
the defendants, merchants in the city of New York, from the
plaintiffs, merchants in England. The goods were shipped at
Liverpool, consigned to the defendants, they paying freight. The
defendants paid tho freight, and on the 9th of April 1842, entered the goods at the custom-house. On the 28th of April, the
defendants having become bankrupt, the plaintiffs' agent called
on them and demanded the goods. The next day, the defendants paid the duties, and passed the goods through the customhouse, when this action was commenced, and the property taken
from the defendants' store, where it had just been received from
the custom-house. The opinion of the Supreme Court sustained
fully the right of the defendants to retain the goods.
BRONSON, C. J., said that the right of stoppage ceases when the
"goods
have reached their place of destination and
have come to
the actual or constructive possession of the consignee. It is
enough that the goods have reached the place of delivery and
the consignee has exercised some act of ownership over them.
In that case, the goods had reached their place of destination,
the carrier had completed his work and received his reward, and
the defendants, besides paying the freight, had entered the goods
at the. custom-house, where they remained at the risk and charge
of the defendants. The court did not doubt that the transitu8
was at an end before the plaintiffs attempted to regain possession. The judgment was affirmed in the Court of Errors, but
upon what precise ground does not appear (5 Denio 629). It.would
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seem, from the opinion of the Chancellor, that, in his view, if the
duties had been paid before the consignors interposed their
claim for stoppage, such payment would have put an end to the
claim; but he held the right extinguished by the fact that the
consignees had obtained the possession of the goods. If, therefore,
this case is an authority for holding that a right of stoppage in
transitu,which once existed, may be terminated by the consignee
entering the goods at the custom-house, paying duties thereon,
and taking possession thereof, for the reason that his possession
is actual, how much clearer is it that, in the present case, where
there was no transit, the'buyer, by the entry at the custom-house
and the giving the bond as the substitute for the duties, has obtained such possession as will preclude the seller from claiming
to exercise that right on the subsequent insolvency of the buyer?
But it is argued that the circumstance that the buyer was engaged in the transportation of the goods to another place than
that at which he purchased them, calls this right into action on
his subsequent insolvency. The claim of the vendor to stop, in
the present case, depends entirely on the fact that the vendee,
at the time or after his insolvency, has the goods in motion. In
the present case, if the buyer had kept the iron in the city of
New York in their or any hired warehouse, it cannot be contended that, on the happening of their insolvency, the right of
stoppage would have existed. As already observed, the transit,
in contemplation of the law, is that set on foot by the vendor,
the passing over of the goods from the vendor to the place of
ultimate destination named by the vendee to him at the time of
purchase. I have examined a large number of cases, and not
one has fallen inder my observation where the right has been
held to exist in a case like the present, where the vendee has
initiated the transit, and with which the vendor had no connection. There is an entire absence of any indication in the contract of sale, or bill of parcels, or receipt for the purchase-money,
that the buyer ever named to the seller any place for the ultimate
destination of the iron purchased. It is obvious that the party
selling might have supposed that the purchaser intended to use
the iron, at some point, on its road for its construction; but I see
no obligation entered into on the part of the buyer thus to use
it, or any representation that it would be so used made to the
seller.
If I correctly appreciate the legal rights of the purchaser, there
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was nothing in any engagement we can see he entered into with
the seller, in the present case, to preclude him from making any
sale or other disposition of the iron, or the pledge and transfer
thereof on the 10th of July to the plaintiffs. In the case of
.Harris vs. Pratt, 17 N. Y. Rep. 249, where this court sustained
the right of stoppage, it was placed distinctly on the ground that
the goods were bought in both cases for shipment to known parties
at a given foreign port, which was their ultimate destination, and
that destination was mentioned to the sellers. "New York was
the destination contemplated from the beginning. It was the
one named to the vendor :" Per DFNIo, J. It is believed that
it is no answer to say, that though Milwaukie or some other point
on the line of the purchaser's road was not named to the seller,
yet the delivery to the purchaser, knowing that he would transport
the article purchased to some such point, has the same legal effect
as if the vendee had named such place to the vendor as that of
the ultimate destination of the article, and it had been "consigned
by the vendor to the vendee there. It is apprehended that this
cannot be sustained. In the case of .Meletopulo vs. Ranking,supra,
the cargo of currants was purchased to be sent to England, and it
was well known to both buyer and seller that such was to be their
ultimate destination, and the seller in that case placed them on
board the ship. Yet it was held that the doctrine of stoppage
in transitu did not apply to the new voyage; that it was the
voyage initiated by the buyer, with which the seller had no connection. The plaintiff in that case, it was said, might be considered the consignee of the goods to Vostizza, but it stopped
there, and there was no right remaining in him afterwards to
stop the goods in their further transit to England. In _owley
vs. Bigelow, 8upra, the corn was taken from one ship in the port
of New York, and laden on another bound for Boston. The purchaser of course knew his intent, in reference to the consignment
to Boston, and doubtless the seller was aware also of its destination. He must have known it was going by sea somewhere. But
the court held that the delivery of the corn on board the purchaser's vessel was a termination of the transit, and the right of
the vendor to stop in transituwas at an end. To the same effect
is TValpy vs. Gibson, supra. So, also, in the case of 0owasjee
vs. Thomson, supra, the purchaser made the shipment upon the
Buckinghamshire for the express purpose of exporting the lead
to Bombay. Thomson & Co., the sellers, were aware of the
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purchaser's intention thus to export the lead, for they placed it
on board the ship at the purchaser's instance, and doubtless well
knew where she was bound. In this case, therefore, both parties
knew of the further transit contemplated, and the committee of
the Privy Council held that such further transit, set in motion
exclusively by the purchaser, did not create or revive any right
of the original vendor to stop the goods in transituafter their
delivery on board the ship. A strong case as illustrative of
these views is that of Fowler vs. 1ymer et al., mentioned by
Park, counsel in Hodqson vs. Ley, 7 Term R. 4-38, but more in
detail by LAWRENCE, J., in Bohttingk vs. Inylis, 3 East 396. That
case was tried before GROSE, J. The bankrupts were Hunter &
Co., who were in possession of a ship let to them for three years,
during which time they were to have complete control of her.
The ship had been on one voyage to Alexandria, and had the
goods put on board her to carry them on another voyage to the
place, not for the purpose of conveying them from the plaintiffs
to the bankrupts, but that they might be sent by the bankruyts
on a mercantile adventure, for which they had bought them.
There the delivery was complete. LAWRENCE, J., in 3 East 398,
says he recognises the authority of Fowler vs. 14ymer to the
extent that case goes, namely, that if one purchase goods here
to be sent abroad, and they are delivered on board a chartered
ship in a port of this kingdom, such delivery is in effect a
delivery to the vendee.
I have found no case holding a different doctrine, and I must
regard it, therefore, as settled that, under such circumstances,
the right of stoppage cannot exist. Such a result is in harmony
with the principle upon which the right is founded. A resort to
this right is permitted to enforce the lien of the vendor for the
unpaid price of his goods. Ordinarily, a lien only exists while
the party claiming it retains the possession of the property upon
which it exists. If he surrender the possession, his lien is extinguished. To maintain the lien of a vendor to the purchase
price, the courts have always regarded the carrier a middleman,
engaged in the transportation of the goods from the vendor to
the vendee at the place of destination named by the vendee, as
the agent of the vendor, and as long as the agent of transportation and delivery continued in possession of the property, such possession was that of the consignor. And if insolvency of the vendee
happened while such possession lasted, the consignor, or vendor
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could enforce his lien, by the exercise of the right of stoppage
in transitu. A slight examination of the cases will illustrate
and enforce these views.
A leading case in the courts, and upon which Lord KENYON,
in -Ellisvs. Hunt, said all the others are founded, is that of Snee
vs. Prescott,before Lord HARDWICKE, in 1743 (1 Atk. 245), where
he held that if goods are actually delivered to a carrier to be delivered to A., and while the carrier is upon the road, and before
actual delivery to A. by the carrier, the consignor hears A., the
consignee, is likely to become bankrupt or is actually one, and
countermands the delivery, he may do so, because the goods while
in transitumight be so countermanded. This equitable rule of
stoppage in transituwas first enunciated in 1690, in Wiseman vs.
Vandeputt, in a case in chancery, heard before the Lords Commissioners (2 Vernon 203). A., being beyond seas, consigns
goods to B., then in good circumstances in London, but before
the goods arrive B. becomes a bankrupt. It was held that if A.
can by any means prevent the goods coming into the hands of
B. or his assignees, it is allowable in equity. As has been remarked, possession and continuance of possession are indispensable
to the exercise of a right of lien in any case. An abandonment
of the custody over which the right extends necessarily frustrates any power to retain them, and operates as an absolute
waiver of the lien. The holder, in such case, is deemed to yield
up the security he has upon the goods and trust to the personal
responsibility of the owners (Cross on Liens, p. 38). It was
formerly supposed that a completion of the voyage, or the arrival
oT the goods at the place of destination named by the buyer to the
seller, was necessary to defeat the right of the vendor to seize the
goods on non-payment of the purchase-money, and the insolvency
of the purchaser. In Host vs. Pownal, 1 Esp. Rep. 240, Lord KENYON said, at nisi priss, that in order to give the consignee a right
to possession it should be a possession obtained by the consignee
on the completion of the voyage. But in a later case, 20ifll vs.
Ball, 2 Bos. & Pull. 456, referring to what had been said by
Lord KENYON, that the right of stoppage continues until the
goods have arrived at their journey's end, Lord ALyANLEY held
that if the vendee meet them upon the road and take them into
his own possession, the goods will then have arrived at their
journey's end, with reference to the right of stoppage.
This is upon the well-recognised and familiar principle that
VOL. XMIL-40
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the goods thereby came into the actual possession of the vendee,
and thereby the vendor lost all possession of them, and his lien
then terminated, and his right of stoppage in transitu to enforce
such lien also terminated.
CHAMBRE, J., in delivering his opinion in Oppenlheim vs. Bussell, 3 Bos. & Pull. 42, says: , Perhaps the consignee himself may intercept the goods in their passage, and, indeed, I have
little doubt but that if he do intercept them in their passage before the consignor has exercised his right of stoppage in transtu,
and do take an actual delivery from the carrier before the goods
get to the end of their journey, that such delivery to him will be
complete."
See also Foster vs. -Frampton,6 B. & C. 107. It
follows, therefore, that it is not a necessary consequence -that
when a person orders goods to be delivered at a particular place,
the transitus continues, in general, till they have been delivered
accordingly, or that the vendee or consignee may not under any
circumstances anticipate the delivery. For instance, if before
the goods reach their ultimate destination he direct a postponement of their delivery, or d*o any act equivalent to taking actual
possession of them, the transitus may be previously determined.
Thus, taking samples from the whole stock, and directing the
carrier to keep the goods in his warehouse till he receives further
directions, constitutes the carrier the consignee's warehouseman,
and his possession is as much the possession of the consignee as
if the latter had taken the whole bulk into his own warehouse.
(Cross on Liens, p. 381 ; -Fostervs. Frampton, supra).
Lord KENYON, previous to the case of Ellis vs. Hunt, in some
case not reported, had said that to confer property on the consignee a corporal touch was necessary. And Lord MANSFIELD, in
the case of Hunter vs. Beall, tried before him at the sittings at
Guildhall, 1785, said the goods must come to the corporal touch
of the vendees, otherwise they may be stopped in transitu. In
delivering his opinion in Ellis vs. Hunt, 3 Term Rep. 464, Lord
KENYON remarked: - As to the necessity of the goods coming to
the, corporal touch' of the bankrupt (in that case the consignee),
that is merely a figurative expression, and has never been literally
adhered to. For there may be an actual delivery of the goods
without the bankrupt's seeing them-as a delivery of the key
of the vendee's warehouse to the purchaser." And in the case
of Wright vs. Lanes, 4 Esp. 82, the same judge observed: ,, I
once said that to confer- property on the consignee a corporal
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touch was necessary. I wish the expression had never been used,
as it says too much; but here, if a corporal touch was necessary to
confer a property on the consignee, it had taken place; but all that
is necessary is, that the consignee exercise some act of ownership
on the property consigned to him, and he has done so here. He
has paid for the warehouse room; he has tasted and taken samples
cf the wines."
In -Dixon vs. Baldwin, 5 East 175 (a leading case on this sub-'
ject), Lord ELLENBOROUGH in commenting upon these observations
of Lord MANSFIELD, in Hunter vs. Beall, remarks: "It is a
figurative expression, rarely if ever strictly true. If it be predicated of the vendee's own actual touch, or of the touch of any
other person, it comes in each instance to a question whether the
party to whose touch it actually comes be an agent so far as representing the principal, as to make a delivery to him, a full,
effectual, and final delivery to the principal, as contradistinguished from a delivery to a person virtually acting as a carrier
or means of conveyance to or on account of the principal, in a
mere course of transit towards him."
BAYLEY, J., in -Fostervs. Frampton, supra, held the transitus
in that case at an end. That where a man orders goods to be
delivered at a particular place, the transitus continues until they
are delivered to the consignee at that place-but that must be
understood of a delivery in the ordinary course of business; for
if-the consignee before the goods reach their ultimate destination
postpones the delivery, or does any act which is equivalent to
taking actual possession of them, the transitus is at an end.
HOLROYD, J., said: "The transit of the goods was at an end by
the act of the consignee treating the goods as his own property,
taking part to his own premises, and directing the other part to
remain in the warehouse of the carrier." In Wright vs. Larves,
4 Esp. 82, it was decided that the consignee might meet the
goods before they arrived at his residence, and take possession of
them, and that this ended the transit, and in such a case no right
of stoppage existed.
The railroad company, in the present case, in the completion
of their purchase with Vose, Livingston & Co., and the delivery
of the iron to them, became the absolute owners thereof, having
the possession of the same, and exercising acts of ownership over
it. The circumstance, that they thought proper for their own
convenience or necessities, to transport it to a distant part
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of the country, created no lien upon it for the purchase-money,
nor did it revive any which might theretofore have existed. A
careful examination of all the authorities which I have been enabled to reach, has failed to furnish any principle upon which
Vose, Livingston & Co. can invoke the right of stoppage in
transitu, under the circumstances disclosed in the present case.
-Those which have fallen under my observation, in which the right
sustained has been in addition to those already referred to, are
the following: H7olst vs. Pownal, I Esp. 240; Oppenheim vs.
Russell, 3 Bos. & Pull. 42; Stokes vs. La Biviere, cited 3 Term
Rep. 466; Hunter vs. Beale, Id.; Hodgson vs. Lay, 7 Id. 436;
6bates vs. Bailton, 6 B. & C. 422; Nichols vs. Le Feuvre, 2 Bing.
N. C. 81; Jackson vs. Nichol, 5 Id. 508; Smith vs. Goss, 1
Campb. 282; Tucker vs. Humphrey, 4 Bing. 516; Whitehead
vs. Anderson, 9 M. & W. 518; Aguire vs. Parmalee, 22 Conn.
473. A brief synopsis of the facts in these cases, and the points
decided, will substantiate the views already expressed.
I Wiseman vs. Vandeput, 2 Vern. 203 (1690), was heard in
chancery by the Lords Commissioners. Plaintiffs were assignees
of Brunells, merchants in London, and claimed goods purchased by Brunells in Leghorn, to be shipped to them at London. The sellers, hearing of their failure before the goods left
Leghorn, altered their destination, and consigned them to defendant, and it was held, that if the vendors could by any means get
their goods again into their own hands, or prevent their coming
into the hands of the bankrupts, it was but lawful for them so to
do, and very allowable in equity.
_Ex parte Wilkinson, in chancery, 1755, before Lord HARDWICKE, as cited in Ambler 410. Wines were consigned from
Lisbon to a merchant in London. The wines were brought to
Lyons, and the consignee becoming bankrupt, the agent of the
consignor stopped them there; and it was held, he might do so
at any time before they got into the hands of the consignee.
Lord HARDWICKE said, as there was no possession in the bankrupt, the agent had a right to stop them.
-D'Aquilavs. Lambert (1761), in chancery, Ambler 899. The
plaintiff being a merchant at Leghorn, by direction of defendant,
Israeli, who resided in England, bought a large quantity of
goods, and consigned them to him, and drew bills of exchange for
the money. The bills were accepted by Israeli, but were protested for non-payment on his becoming insolvent, making a con-
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position with his creditors, and assigning his effects in trust for
them. Lord NORTHINGTON decreed the goods to be delivered to
the plaintiff, holding, that the plaintiff was substantially to be
considered as a merchant selling goods to Israeli, and that the
case of Wilkinson is in point: Snee vs. Prescott, 1 Atk. 245
(1743). Lord HARDWICKE held, that the consignor's right of
stoppage in transitu, was not divested until actual delivery to the
consignee. He puts this case :-Suppose the goods are actually
delivered to a carrier, to be delivered to A., and while the carrier
is upon the road, and before actual delivery to A. by the carrier,
the consignor hears that A., his consignee, is likely to become a
bankrupt, or is actually one, and countermands the delivery, and
gets them back into his own possession again, I am of opinion
that no action of trover would lie by the assignees of A., because
the goods while in transitu, might be so countermanded: Stokes
vs. La .iviere, cited by counsel in -Ellisvs.1Runt, 3 Term Rep.
466; but a more full note of it is found in the opinioi of LAWRENCE, J., in Bohtlingk vs. Inglis, 8 East 396.
It was tried before Lord MANSFIELD, at the Guildhall Sittings, December 18th
1784. In that case, Duhems, of Lisle, purchased of plaintiffs in
London a quantity of ribbons, which plaintiff delivered to defendants, to be forwarded to Lisle. The goods were forwarded by the
defendants to their correspondents at Ostend, with directions to
send them to the Duhems. On the arrival of the goods at
Ostend, the defendant's correspondents wrote to the Duhems,
that the goods had arrived there, and that they awaited their
directions. The defendants contended, that immediately upon
the delivery of the goods by the plaintiff to them, the property
vested in Messrs. Duhems, and that they, the defendants, had a
right to retain them. Lord MANSFIELD said: "cNo point is more
clear than that if goods are sold and the price not paid, the seller
may stop them in transitu. I mean, in every sort of passage to
the hands of the buyers. There have been a hundred cases of
this sort. In short, when the .goods are in transitu, the seller
has that proprietary lien. The goods are in the hands of the
defendant, to be conveyed-the owner may get them back again."
Lord ELLENBOROUGH, in 5 East 185, says of this case:

, This,

however, in respect to Duhems, on whose right the defendant
stood, was clearly a case-of transit, not finished at the time the
claim was made."
Hunter vs. Beale, cited in _Ellis vs. tunt, 3 Term Rep. 466,
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was tried also before Lord MANSFIELD, at the Guildhall, in 1785.
It was said to be an action of trover for a bale of cloth which was
sent by Messrs. Steers & Co., of Wakefield, to the defendant, who
was an innkeeper, directed for the bankrupts, to whom the defendant's book-keeper gave notice that a bale had arrived for
them. Steers & Co. at the same time sent them a bill of parcels
by the post, the receipt of which they acknowledged, and wrote
word that they had placed the amount to the credit of Steers &
Co. The bankrupts gave orders to the book-keeper of defendant
to send the bale down to the gallery quay, in order to ship it on
board a vessel to go to Boston. The defendant accordingly sent
the bale to the quay, but arriving too late to be shipped, it was
sent back to him.. Within ten days afterwards a clerk of the
bankrupts went to the wareroom of the defendant, when he asked
him what was to be done with the bale in question, and was
ordered by the clerk to keep it in his custody till another ship
sailed, which would happen in a few days. The bankruptcy
occurred soon after, and Steers & Co. claimed the bale of the
defendant, who refused to deliver it up. Lord MANSFIELD was
clearly of the opinion, that though the goods might be legally
delivered to the vendees for many purposes, yet as for this purpose there must be an absolute and actual possession by the
bankrupts, or (as he expressed it) they must have come to the
corporal touch of the vendees, otherwise they may be stopped
in transitu, a delivery to a third person to convey to them is not
sufficient. This opinion of Lord MANSFIELD was distinctly overruled by Lord ELLENBOROUGH in Baldwin vs. -Dixon,5 East 182,
where he says: ,In Bunter vs. Beale, Sittings after Trin. 1785,
before Lord MANSFIELD, I cannot but consider the transit as
having been once completely at an end in the direct course of the
goods to the vendee; i. e., when they arrived at the innkeeper's,
and were afterwards under the immediate orders of the vendee,
thence actually launched again in a course of conveyance from
him, in their way to Boston, being in a new direction, prescribed
and communicated by himself. And if the transit be once at an
end the delivery is complete, and the transitus for this purpose
cannot commence de novo, merely because the goods are again
sent upon their travels towards a new and ulterior destination."
In harmony with these views of Lord ELLENBOROUGH are the
cases of Allen vs. Gripper, Wentworth vs. Outhwaite, and Dodson
vs. Wentworth, already cited.
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.lodgson, Assignee of Ward, vs. Ley, 7 T. R. 436. In this
case butter was purchased in Cumberland by one Ward, and by
an agreement between him and the seller it was delivered to a
carrier named Golding, who was to take it to Stockton and deliver
it to one Wilkinson, who was to forward it to London. Before
it reached London the purchaser failed and the seller took the
property, and it was held to be a clear case for the exercise of
the right of stoppage in transitu, and that the circumstance of
part payment, much relied on, did not vary the case from that
of others, and that the assignee of the purchaser could not recover
the property from the vendor.
.olst vs. Pownal, 1 Esp. 240. Dutton & Co. were merchants
in Liverpool, and directed plaintiff, a merchant at Leghorn, to
charter a vessel on their account, with a cargo of fruit. ie
chartered the vessel and put on board the cargo of fruit, and
before the vessel arrived in Liverpool, Dutton & Co. stopped payment. On the arrival of the vessel in Liverpool, Spencer, one
of the assignees of Dutton & Co., went on board the vessel, she
being at quarantine, at a place outside of Liverpool, claimed the
cargo, opened some of the boxes, and put two persons on board,
who remained there alternately till quarantine ended on 18th
June. On that day the vessel came into the harbor, and broke
bulk on the 19th, when demand was made on behalf of the plaintiff for the fruit. Lord KENYoN was of the opinion that it was a
sufficient stoppage in transitu to maintain the action ; that in
order to give the consignees a right to claim by virtue of possession, it should be a possession obtained by the consignees on the
completion of the voyage.
Coates vs. -Raillon, 6 B. & C. 422. Plaintiffs were calico
dealers at Manchester, and Butlers were Lisbon merchants
carrying on trade in Lisbon and in London. They had a partner
in the Lisbon house named Krus, and his name appeared in the
firm doing business there. Goods-were purchased of plaintiffs in
Manchester by the London house for the Lisbon house, and the
London house informed plaintiffs that they were to be sent to
Lisbon, as on former occasions. The goods were on the 28th
June delivered at defendant's warehouse, with an invoice. They
were to forward them to Liverpool, to be shipped there to the
purchasers at Lisbon. The goods remained in defendant's warehouse at the time of the failure of the Lisbon house, the purchasers. Lord TENTERMN held that as the goods were purchased
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of the vendors to be sent to Lisbon, the latter would have the
right to stop them so long as they were in a course of conveyance
to Lisbon. That the goods having been delivered by the sellers
for the purpose of being forwarded to Lisbon, the tran8itue in
that case was not at an end, and that the plaintiffs had a right to
stop them. BAYLEY, J.: ,It is a general rule, that when goods
are sold to be sent to a particular destination named by the vendee,
the right of the vendor to stop them continues until they arrive
at that place of destination." He says of Rowe vs. Pickford,
there was no ulterior place of destination named to the vendor.
So of Leeds vs. Wright : there the vendor had sent the goods to
the only place mentioned by the buyer, and as between the buyer
and seller there was no place of ulterior destination.
Nichols vs. Le.Feuvre, 2 Bing. N. C. 81. Le Couteur, who carried on business in Guernsey, purchased of plaintiff, in London,
several bales of goods, which he directed to be forwarded to
Guernsey, addressed to him, care of Le Feuvre, Southampton,
who took them and shipped them to Guernsey in his own name.
TINDAL, C. J., said, So far, therefore, as any question arises in
this case of stoppage in transitu,there is nothing to take this
case out of the general principle. The consignment was clearly
to Guernsey, and the tran8ituswas not at an end till the goods
reached that destination.
Smith vs. Goss, 1 Camp. 282. Scaife, a merchant in Newcastle, ordered goods of the plaintiffs, at Birmingham, directing
them to be forwarded to him at Newcastle, either by way of London or Gainesborough. If sent by way of London, they were to
go to the care of defendant there, with directions to send them
by first vessel to Newcastle. Lord ELLENBOROUGH held that the
plaintiffs were entitled to recover, as the goods, having been sent
to the defendant at London for the purpose of being forwarded
to Newcastle, were at a stage upon their transit, and could not be
considered as having reached their final destination, when at the
wharfinger's in London.
Tucker vs. Humphrey, 4 Bing. 516. Flour was purchased by one
Gilbert, with directions to send it to London by water, consigned to
the wharf of the defendant, Humphrey. The flour arrived, but was
not landed from the ship until after Gilbert became a bankrupt.
PARK, J., says, it was agreed on behalf of Gilbert's assignees, that,
by the arrival of the ship at the wharf, the transit was over; but that
nobody can doubt that if such a state of things as is above supposed
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had existed, such as the goods having been put into a warehouse
on the wharf, which, the bankrupt, having no warehouse of his
own, had been in the habit of using as his own, and marking or
doing some act upon them, the transit would have been over.
Whitehead vs. Anderson, 9 M. & W. 518, was a shipment of
timber from Quebec to plaintiff's assignor, and before its arrival
at Liverpool the consignee became a bankrupt. The defendants,
as agents of the consignor, demanded the timber, but this was
after the consignee had been on board and made the same demand of the captain. It was held that there was no actual possession taken of the timber by the consignee, nor was there any
constructive possession, as the promise of the captain to hold the
timber for plaintiffs did not alter the relation in which he stood
as before ", as a mere instrument of conveyance to an appointed
place of destination."
Jackson vs. Nichol, 5 Bing. N. C. 508, was a case where lead was
purchased of plaintiffs in Newcastle by persons living in London,
and the right was exercised to qtop before it actually reached the
possession of the buyers in London. TINDAL, 0. J., says the
general rule is, that the tran8itus is not at an end until the goods
arrive at t he actual or constructive possession of the consignee;
and if the lead had in that case been deivered into the possession
of the agent of the buyers, there to remain until he received
orders for its ulterior destination, such possession of the agent
would have been the constructive possession of the buyers themselves, and the right to stop in transitu would have been at an
end. The case would then have fallen within the principle laid
down in Dixon vs. Baldwin. But the facts in that case were,
that the agent merely received to forward to the buyers in London-he was merely acting in the conveyance. The same rule
was recognised as in Whitehead vs. Anderson, that the demand of
possession was not taking possession. The Chief Justice said:
"cAlthough it might be conceded to be the better opinion that if
the vendee actually receives the possession of his goods in their
passage to him, and before the voyage has completely terminated,
that the delivery is complete, and the right of stoppage gone;
yet no authority has been cited for the position, and the principle
seems the other way, that a mere demand by the vendee, without
any delivery before the voyage has completely terminated, deprives the consignor of his right of stoppage."
The principle of this case was affirmed in that of Aguirre vs.
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Parmelee, 22 Conn. Reps. 473. There a purchase of wool had
been made in New York by an agent of the purchaser, a manufacturing corporation, located in Connecticut, for the purpose
of being there manufactured. It was delivered to the agent to
be sent to the buyers, and while on its transit from New York to
Connecticut, and before it came to the possession of the vendees, it was stopped by the seller. The court held it to be an
ordinary case of stoppage in transitu, that the agent in New
York, who purchased the wool and to whom it was delivered,
stood in the position of a mere forwarding agent. That to take
away the right of stoppage, there must have been an absolute
delivery in New York for the use of the vendees, and it must have
been a full and final delivery as contradistinguished from a delivery
to a person acting as a carrier or forwarding agent to the principal,
and this delivery should be at the place named by the purchaser to
the vendor as the place of final delivery or ultimate destination of
the goods.
The cases in the courts of this state upon this subject may
properly be considered here. The first in point of time is that of
Hollingsworthvs. Napier, already referred to. The next is that
of Buckley vs. Turniss, 15 Wend, 137. Plaintiff was a merchant
in Troy ; Titus, the purchaser, lived at Titusville, eight miles
from Malone, in Franklin County. He sent an order dated
Malone, for four tons of iron, which the plaintiff produced, and
also a previous order, dated nine days previously, for half a ton
of steel to be sent to him, and directed it to be forwarded to the
care of Green, at Plattsburgh. The iron was sent, directed to
Titus, at Malone, care of Green, at Plattsburgh, and sent by
canal-boat and sloop to Green, at Plattsburgh. On 9th September, forty-one tons of iron were delivered by Green to one Burton, a carrier by canal, employed by Titus to convey the iron from
Plattsburgh to Titusville. While Burton was at Malone, the iron
was taken out of his possession on an attachment against Titus
in favor of defendant, Furniss. Titus became insolvent, and his
drafts given for the iron were protested. On the trial, defendant moved for a nonsuit, which was granted on the ground that
the evidence did not show a right in the plaintiff to stop the iron
in transitu. The Supreme Court set aside the nonsuit and
granted a new trial, the court holding that in the case of a sale
on credit, the vendor may resume the possession of the goods
while they are in the hands of a carrier or middleman in their
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transit to the consignee or vendee on his becoming bankrupt or
insolvent.
In this case the goods had neither reached their destination,
nor had they come to the actual possession of the vendee. They
were in the hands of a carrier or middleman on their way to the
vendee, and the plaintiff had a right to stop them. The case
was again before the court in 17 Wend. 504, and the question
then was whether the delivery of one wagon-load of the iron to
Titus at Titusville before the plaintiff intercepted the residue,
was a delivery of the whole consignment so as to destroy the
right of stoppage in transitu as to the portion not delivered, and
the court held it was not. That the delivery of a portion of the
consignment was no evidence of any act of possession or ownership as to the forty-one bars of iron in controversy.
.Hitekcock vs. Covill, 20 Wend. 167. Graves, the purchaser,
bought goods in the city of New York of the plaintiff. He resided at Willardsburg, Tioga county, a distance of betweoen thirty
and forty miles from Havana. Havana was at the head of
navigation on the Seneca Lake, to which point goods were forwarded from New York by canal and lake boats. Graves directed the goods to be shipped on board lake or canal boats to
Havana, and they were boxed and directed to him at WillardsOn 28th May, Graves came to
burgh, and there shipped.
-Havana for his goods, but finding they had been levied on by
Covill, sheriff of Tioga county, by virtue of an execution on a
judgment against him, he. did not take them. The Supreme
Court held that the transitus was at an end, but on the ground
of fraud, refused to disturb the verdict in favor of plaintiff. The
case was taken to the Court of Errors, and the judgment of the
Supreme Court affirmed. The Chancellor, in giving the opinion
of the court on the question of stoppage in transitu, takes the
ground that the transitus was not ended, that the delivery to the
warehouseman at Havana was but a delivery to a middleman,
engaged in the conveyance. That the goods, being directed to
the vendee at his place of business at Willardsburgh, they were
delivered at the warehouse at Havana merely because that was
a point in the transit, and not because the warehouseman was the
general agent of the purchaser. The fact that there was no public conveyance from there to the residence of the purchaser, and
that, therefore, it was necessary for the purchaser to send a team
himself to complete the transit, he apprehended could not defeat
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the right of stoppage, while the goods remained in the hands of
the warehouseman, who was a middleman merely, and not the
general agent of either the vendor or vendee. He admits that if the
purchaser had sent on his own teams and thus obtd~ned possession of the goods on a delivery thereof to his own teamsters by
the warehouseman, a different question would be presented.
Harrisvs. Pratt,17 N. Y. Rep. 249, is a case which was carefully considered in this court, and the opinion contains a review
of all the leading cases on the doctrine under consideration. In
that case plaintiffs were manufacturers at Leicester, England.
John and James Hall were partners in trade, having a house at
Nottingham, England, and one in the city of New York. One
of the partners resided at Nottingham, and one in New York.
The goods were purchased by an agent of the Halls, with directions to manufacture them for-the New York market, and stating
that they were to go to New York, and directing the plaintiffs to
pack them in the ustial way and send them to Edwards, Sandford
& Co., Liverpool, and that they were not to be forwarded-for shipment until about May 1st 1854. In February 1854, plaintiffs informed Halls at Nottingham that the goods were ready, and asked
for the marks and numbers to put on the cases, which were seat.
On the-25th of April, the plaintiffs informed the Halls, at Nottingham, that they had sent the goods in eight cases to Edwardi,
Sandford & Co., Liverpool, "to await their further orders for
shipment," and at same time plaintiffs wrote shipping agents that
they had sent the eight cases for the Halls of Nottingham, from
whom they would receive further instructions. The Halls, by
letter from Nottingham, instructed Edwards, Sandford & Co. to
ship the cases to the New-York house. They arrived in New
York June 10th, before which time Halls had stopped payment.
On the 14th June, the agent of plaintiffs demanded the goods
of the owners of the ship, of the custom-house officers on board,
and also of the defendants, to whom Hall, the remaining partner,
had made an assignment. This court held that the right of stoppage intransitu existed, and that the transit was not at an end.
The general rule is well stated, and such as is sustained .bythe
authorities, "that while the goods remain in the possession of
persons concerned in their transportation to the place of destination named by the purchaser, they may, in the event of his failure, be reclaimed by the seller. It is not material whether the
person in whose possession they are when the seller interposes

